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INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASE VENUE
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
THE PARMALAT AND DAISYTEK CONTROVERSIES
Hon. Samuel L. Bufford'
The European Union Insolvency Regulation (the EU Regulation) is
a giant step forward in promoting international cooperation
among EU countries for cross-border insolvency proceedings. It
adopts a modified universalist solution to cross-border
proceedings insofar as they are located within the EU. However,
experience has shown that it needs improvements to work
effectively. A venue battle now rages between courts of several
European countries over which country's courts will administer
particular cross-border proceedings, and how the center of main
interest is to be determined for this purpose.
This Article begins with a detailed examination of the two
principal cases where conflicts have arisen, Eurofood and
Daisytek. Eurofood is a subsidiary of Parmalat, which has
produced the largest insolvency case in European history. The
Irish and Italian courts have both opened main insolvency
proceedings for the Eurofood subsidiary, and the controversy is
now pending before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). For the
Daisytek French subsidiary, both English and French courts have
opened main insolvency cases, and an appeal is pending before the
French Cour de Cassation, where the Ministry of Justice is
expected to recommend submission to the ECJ.
Two very important substantive modifications would vastly
improve the EU Regulation. First, the EU Regulation needs to
provide for the filing in the same country (thereby permitting the
filing in the same court) of members of a corporate group that are
economically integrated. It is very difficult (if at all possible) to
reorganize a corporate empire when its insolvency proceedings
are distributed among a number of countries.
Second, the EU Regulation needs to clarify the definition of
"center of main interest" (CoMI) and to specify what a court
should consider in making the CoMI determination. A court
should weigh the following factors: (1) the location of operations
and management decisions of the corporation; (2) the location of
the "nerve center" or place of principal decision-making for the
corporation; and (3) the expectations of creditors, such as
suppliers and financiers, as to the CoMI decision in the event that
the company goes into an insolvency proceeding.
U .S. Bankruptcy Judge, Central District of California; Nomura Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law
School, Winter 2005. J.D., University of Michigan, 1973; Ph.D., University of Texas, 1969; B.A.,
Wheaton College, 1964.
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This Article also argues for three kinds of procedural
improvements: (1) decoupling the decision on whether a
proceeding is a main proceeding from the decision opening the
proceeding itself, to give an opportunity to the parties in interest to
be heard on the subject of whether a proceeding is a main
proceeding; (2) defining what constitutes a 'judgment opening
insolvency proceedings, " to specify what steps qualify under this
term in those countries where an opening order or judgment is not
a typical part of the insolvency process; (3) adopting procedures
to recognize the due process rights of foreign estate
administrators, foreign creditors, and other parties in interest in a
cross-border insolvency proceeding.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A battle rages in the courts of the European Union (EU) over which country's
courts will handle some of Europe's largest insolvency proceedings. In the case of
Eurofood IFSC Ltd. (Eurofood), an Irish subsidiary of Parmalat SpA' (an Italian
corporation that is the subject of the largest insolvency proceeding in European
history),2 the Irish Supreme Court has ruled that the Parma court administering the
Parmalat proceeding lacked jurisdiction for its decision to open a main proceeding3
The bankruptcy proceeding for the Parmalat business empire involves debts totaling some €20
billion in creditor claims, and expects to have assets of E3.7 billion to ES billion (of which E2 billion is
expected in recoveries from litigation) from which to pay these claims. See David Reilly & Alessandra
Galloni, Fresh Milk: Parmalat Stock to Trade Again, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2005, at CI.
2 The Parmalat (Eurofood) and Daisytek cases have raised the most controversy and conflicts
between national court decisions. Other cases have arisen where courts in one country have deferred to
prior decisions in other countries opening main proceedings. See, e.g., In re Rover Francesas, May 4,
2005 (recognizing opening of main case in Birmingham, England).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 29-44 for an explanation of "main proceeding."
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for Eurofood,4 and that the Parma court also violated the International Convention on
Civil Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in
making this determination. Similarly, in both the German and the French Daisytek5
proceedings, the courts found that the English high court in Leeds lacked jurisdiction
to open a main insolvency proceeding for French and German subsidiaries. The
decisions of the courts of first instance in France and Germany were reversed on
appeal. Review of the French appellate decision is pending in the Cour de
6Cassation.
In the Eurofood proceeding, the Irish Supreme Court has referred five issues to
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for determination preliminary to the Irish court
issuing its decision, and a decision from the Court of Justice is pending. The French
Ministry of Justice is expected to request the Cour de Cassation to refer the French
Daisytek proceeding to the Court of Justice, as well.
The stakes are huge. The decision on which country will handle a main
international insolvency proceeding determines which country's substantive and
procedural law will govern the proceeding and will have a large impact on how the
assets are realized for the benefit of creditors.7 While the Italian Parmalat
proceedings (including the Eurofood proceeding) and the English and French
Daisytek proceedings are reorganizations, the Irish Eurofood proceeding is a
liquidation. Furthermore, the reorganization laws of England and France differ
enormously in their goals and in the requirements for approval of a reorganization
plan. In addition, the venue decisions will determine which country's professionals
(and judges) will handle the substantial majority of the insolvency work.8
In my view, these conflicts have resulted from both substantive and procedural
shortcomings in the European Union Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EU
Regulation). 9 The EU Regulation needs substantive revision to permit the filing in
the same country (and presumably the same court) of companies integrally related in
a corporate group. As a second substantive change to the EU Regulation, I argue
that the definition of "center of main interests" needs to be refined so that courts will
have clearer guidance on the appropriate factors to be considered when determining
where a debtor's center of main interests is located.
In addition, I propose three kinds of improvements in response to the EU
Regulation's procedural shortcomings. First, appropriate procedural steps should be
adopted to ensure (1) that all of the parties in interest are given an opportunity to be
heard and (2) that all the relevant evidence is received before determining whether
an international insolvency proceeding is a main proceeding or a secondary
proceeding under the EU Regulation. The determination of whether a proceeding
4 See In re Eurofoods IFSC Ltd., [2004] IESC 45 (Ir.).
5 1 use "Daisytek" to refer generally to the corporate group headed by Daisytek Int'l, Inc.
6 The Cour de Cassation is France's highest court for cases in the regular court system. This court
only considers legal issues, and does not take a full appeal in the U.S. sense. A separate court, the Conseil
d'Etat, is the highest court for administrative law cases.
See infra text accompanying note 35; Roland Montefort, European Law on Cross-Border
Insolvencies; Status of French Practice after the E. U. Regulation, AM. BANK. INST. J., Apr. 2004, at 28,
73.
8 See LYNN M. LOPUcKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS ch. 8 (2005), reprinted as Lynn M. LoPucki, Global and Out of Control?, 79
AM. BANKR. L.J. 79, 89 (2005).
9 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 0.. (L 160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EU Regulation].
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qualifies as a main or secondary proceeding should be independent of the decision to
open an insolvency proceeding. Second, the EU Regulation should clarify what
constitutes a "judgment opening insolvency proceedings," to account for that fact
that there is no particular court order to this effect in countries such as England and
Ireland. Third, rules are needed to provide general procedural due process rights for
creditors, foreign liquidators, and other parties in interest.
In addition to their importance for EU law, the decisions under the EU
Regulation are important for U.S. law relating to international insolvencies. U.S.
cases may be susceptible to similar international discord and have suffered from
such discord in the past. In fact, if Daisytek had filed bankruptcy cases in Dallas,
Texas (where it filed the case for the parent corporation, Daisytek International, Inc.,
and eight U.S. subsidiaries) on behalf of its sixteen European companies (who filed
their proceedings in England), a substantially similar problem would have arisen in
these cases.1 0 Furthermore, the recently adopted chapter 15 of the U.S. bankruptcy
code" requires U.S. courts to address these issues under a much more complex legal
framework, 12 instead of the prior section 304, that is similar in many respects to the
EU Regulation.
Under chapter 15, the determination of such problems in U.S. courts turns on the
meaning and application of four crucial new concepts, "center of main interests"
(CoMI), 13 "main proceeding,"'' 4 "non-main proceeding,'
' 5 and "establishment,"'' 6
that did not previously exist at all in U.S. bankruptcy law (or non-bankruptcy law,
for that matter). 17  Indeed, these concepts are unknown in any bankruptcy law
anywhere in the world, with the exception of the EU Regulation and two other
international regimes promulgated in the last decade: the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvencies5 (Model Law) on which Chapter 15 is based, and the
Transnational Insolvency Project' 9 of NAFTA.2 °
'o See generally SAMUEL L. BUFFORD ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY (Fed. Jud. Center
2001).
" See Pub. L. No. 107-8 (2001) (amending II U.S.C. §§ 1501-32 (1978)).
12 See Bankruptcy Code, I I U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005).
" See II U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2005) ("In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the debtor's
registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the
debtor's main interests.").
14 See id § 1502(4) ("'[F]oreign main proceeding' means a foreign proceeding pending in the
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests.").
" See id. § 1502(5) ("'[F]oreign non-main proceeding' means a foreign proceeding, other than a
foreign main proceeding, pending in a country where the debtor has an establishment."). Both chapter 15
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency use the term "non-main
proceeding," a less felicitous locution than the term "secondary proceeding," which is used in the EU
Regulation. The meanings are identical.
16 See id. § 1502(2) ("'[E]stablishment' means any place of operations where the debtor carries out
a non-transitory economic activity.").
17 A detailed examination of chapter 15of the U.S. Bankruptcy Law is beyond the scope of this
Article.
1S Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, May 30, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1386 (1997); see also U.N.
Comm'n on Int'l Trade L. [UNCITRAL], Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency, [1997] XXVIII UNCITRAL Y.B. pt. 3, §2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442, reprinted in 6
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415 (1998); see generally Berends, infra note 56.
19 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY PROJECT: PRINCIPLES OF
COOPERATION IN TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY CASES AMONG THE MEMBERS OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (2000).
20 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993).
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This Article examines a dispute raging in the courts of the EU countries on the
application of the first of these concepts, the CoMI. Part 1I summarizes the relevant
provisions of the EU Regulation. Part Ill describes the Eurofood proceeding, insofar
as it involves a dispute between the courts of Ireland and Italy over which country
has the debtor's CoMI, and is entitled to open and administer its main proceedings.
Part IV examines the proceedings of the French and German Daisytek subsidiaries
that are the subject of bankruptcy filings in England, including the French subsidiary
ISA Daisytek SAS (Daisytek-France) and the German subsidiaries PAR
Beteiligungs GmbH (PAR), ISA Deutschland Gmbh (ISA-Germany) and Supplies
Team GmbH (Supplies Team). Part V describes EU Regulation shortcomings and
recommends substantive and procedural improvements. Part VI contains concluding
remarks.
II. THE EU REGULATION ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
The principal source of law for international cooperation in EU transnational
insolvency proceedings is the EU Regulation,2 1 which became effective on May 31,
200222 for all such proceedings opened on or after that date in the EU countries
23
(other than Denmark, which exercised its right under its EU accession treaty to opt
out of the EU Regulation). The EU Regulation overrides provisions of national law
for EU countries.24 Two Annexes, A and B, specify the national laws of the member
countries that are subject to the EU Convention. The EU Regulation is based on the
principle of mutual trust among the EU countries: 25  they trust their sister EU
countries with respect to both their insolvency laws and their court procedures.
26
The EU Regulation, for the most part, adopts a universalist 27 view: It intends
that a main proceeding encompass all of the debtor's assets on a world-wide basis
21 On the EU Regulation, see generally IAN F. FLETCHER, THE LAW OF INSOLVENCY (3d ed. 2002);
GABRIEL MOSS ET AL., THE EC REGULATION ON INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENTARY AND
ANNOTATED GUIDE (2002); BOB WESSELS, EUROPEAN UNION REGULATION OF INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS (2003).
22 The EU Regulation became effective on May 1, 2004 for the ten countries that joined the EU on
that date.
23 The EU Regulation was originally prepared as a stand-alone treaty for the EU Member States.
See generally FLETCHER, supra note 21, 31-015-31-017. After completion of the drafting in 1995, the
treaty foundered on the United Kingdom's mad cow disease problem in 1996. Mad cow disease broke out
in the cattle herds in the United Kingdom in 1996, and, in consequence, the continental EU countries
imposed a ban on the importation of U.K. beef. Upset with this course of events, the United Kingdom
refused to sign the EU Insolvency Convention. See WESSELS, supra note 21, at 5-6.
24 See MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 3.08.
25 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl. (22).
26 See Bob Wessels, Int'l Jurisdiction to Open Insolvency Proceedings in Europe, in Particular
against (Groups of) Companies, Int'l Insolvency Institute 14-15, http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/
european union.html (explaining the concept of"CoMI" under the EU Regulation).
27 See WESSELS, supra note 21, at 7. For a general description of universalism (including modified
territorialism) and territorialism (its opposite), see Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls are
Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. BANKR. L. REV. 105, 108-17 (2005). For a defense of
pure universalism, see Liza Perkins, Note, A Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate
Insolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 787 (2000). On modified universalism, see generally Kent
Anderson, The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach
Considering the Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 679, 687-94 (2000); Lucian Aiye
Bebchuck & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON.
775, 778 (1999); Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L.
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and to affect all creditors, wherever located.28  Only one main proceeding may be
opened for a particular debtor.29 The universalist posture of the EU Regulation is
tempered by the possibility of secondary proceedings, which must be territorial, in
non-CoMl countries.
The EU Regulation gives primacy to an insolvency proceeding that is opened in
a debtor's "home country." Only that proceeding may be a main proceeding, the
opening of which is entitled to recognition in other countries covered by the EU
Regulation. The home country, for the purposes of a main insolvency proceeding, is
the country where the CoMI of the entity is located,3° which in turn is the proper
location for the main proceeding.3' A corporation can only have one CoMI, for
purposes of the EU Regulation. Proceedings in other countries are generally limited
to secondary proceedings. 32  However, the EU Regulation does not attempt to
reconcile the vastly different insolvency regimes in place in the various EU
countries.
33
The opening of a main proceeding under the EU Regulation has several
consequences.' First, the proceeding is governed by the laws of the country where
it is opened.35  Second, a judgment opening a main proceeding receives automatic
recognition in all Member States with no further formalities from the date that it
REV. 2177, 2179 (2000); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10 (1997); Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 AM.
J. COMP. LAW 573, 575-76 (1993); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global
Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 499, 513 (1991); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to
Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2292-98 (2000); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and
Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 465
(1991). For a defense of territorialism, see LOPUCKI, supra note 8, ch. 8; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Lynn M. LoPucki,
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696
(1999); Lynn M. LoPucki, Universalism Unravels, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143 (2005).
28 See MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 3.15; Miguel Virg6s & Etienne Schmit, Report on the
Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, reprinted in MOSS ET AL., supra note 2 1, at 263. The Virg6s and
Schmit report was the principal report on the EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, which was
converted into the EU Regulation by the substitution of Articles 44-47 (implementing the EU Regulation)
for Articles 43-46 and 48-55 (providing formalities for treaty implementation) and an expansion of the
preamble. Thus, the Virg6s and Schmit report is authoritative as to the EU Regulation as well. See, e.g.,
Case C-341/04, In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd, Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, 2 [hereinafter Eurofood
A.G. Report] (stating that the Virg6s & Schmit report "may provide useful guidance when interpreting the
regulation").
29 See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 15; MOSS ETAL., supra note 21, 7 3.15, 8.33; WESSELS,
supra note 21, at 7.
30 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3.1; see also Wessels, supra note 26, at 4-10 (explaining
the concept of CoMl under EU Regulation). The EU Regulation applies only if the CoMI is located in the
EU. See EU Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl. (14); MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 13.09. Thus the EU
Regulation does not apply to the EU aspects of a cross-border insolvency case if the CoMi is not located
in the EU. See id. 3.09.
31 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3.1.
32 Id. arts. 3.2-3.
33 See id. pmbl. 12.
34 See WESSELS, supra note 21, at 1-2.
35 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4; MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 1 5.33; WESSELS, supra
note 21, at 18-31; lan F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-
of-Lmv Provisions, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 119, 128-39 (1998); Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 153.
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becomes effective in the home state.36 Third, the administrator in the main
proceeding may exercise his or her powers in every EU state, including repatriating
assets,37 registering the judgment, 38 and publishing notice in Member States. These
effects may only be challenged in the home court for the main proceeding.
39
In addition, a judgment opening a main proceeding in any EU country imposes
the forum country's domestic effects of that proceeding throughout the EU, 40 except
where the EU Convention provides otherwise as to rights in remi,
41 setoff rights, 42
and sellers' rights based on reservation of title. For example, an automatic stay or
moratorium under the laws of the forum country for the main proceeding applies to
all creditors in every EU country. 44
Under the EU Regulation, a bankruptcy proceeding in a country where the
debtor's CoMI is not located must be a secondary proceeding.45 The EU Regulation
permits the opening of a secondary proceeding in any country where the debtor has
an establishment, 46 which means, "any place of operations where the debtor carries
on a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods. 47 Because a
secondary proceeding can only be opened in a country where the debtor has an
establishment, the EU Regulation prohibits the opening of an insolvency proceeding
in a non-CoMI country where the debtor does not conduct non-transitory economic
activity with human means and goods.48
36 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 16; WESSELS, supra note 21, at 33-35; Virg6s & Schmit,
supra note 28, 143; MOSS ETAL.,supra note 21, 8.133.
37 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 18.1.
"' See id. art. 22.
39 See id. art. 17.2.4°See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4 (noting that the law of the country that opens main
proceedings applies unless otherwise provided in the EU Regulation); In re Maxwell Communication
Corp., 92 F.3d 1036, 1045-50 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that standard rules of conflict of laws (or
international private law, as the subject is known outside the United States) apply in many contexts in
insolvency proceedings, and in some instances these rules dictate the application of foreign law in the
forum of the main proceeding); Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 90.
41 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 5; Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 94-105.
42 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 6.
41 See id art. 7.
4' The consequences may be different under the EU Regulation if the country where the main
proceeding is opened lacks an automatic stay. For example, under Dutch law there is no automatic stay,
and a stay is typically issued by the court. As another example, in Hungary, a stay is issued only if it is
approved in the meeting of creditors. See Act XLIX of 1991 § 9 (as amended), available at
http://www.insol-europe.org/downloads/accession/HungarianlnsolvencyActEN.pdf (On Bankruptcy
Proceedings, Liquidation Proceedings and Members' Voluntary Dissolution). Because the exceptions in
the EU Regulation appear to apply only to moratoria that arise automatically upon the opening of a
proceeding, Article 25 may require that a stay that is not automatic does affect rights in rem, set off rights
and sellers' rights based on reservation of title.
45 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3.2-3.
46 See id. This provision was deliberately drawn narrowly to limit the opportunities of creditors to
obtain personal or tactical advantages by means of secondary proceedings. See MOSS ET AL., supra note
21, 8.26.
47 EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2(h). An establishment differs from a subsidiary in that it is not
separately incorporated. Economic activity consisting solely in assets or investments does not qualify as
an "establishment." See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 70.
41 See WESSELS, supra note 21, at 1I.
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There are two main purposes for secondary proceedings: to assist and support
the main proceeding and to protect local creditors from the main proceeding.49 The
adoption of the law of the forum country for the main proceeding, and its exportation
throughout the EU, are substantially modified if a secondary proceeding is opened in
another EU country.50 Under the EU Regulation, a secondary proceeding is
governed by the local law of the country where it is opened. 5' While the EU
Regulation requires that a secondary proceeding be a liquidation proceeding, 52 it also
authorizes the administrator in the main proceeding to obtain a stay of the liquidation
for three months at a time, 3 and to propose a reorganization as authorized by the
insolvency laws of the country where the secondary proceeding is opened. 4
A. Center of Main Interests
The jurisdictional challenge under the EU Regulation is to determine where the
CoMI is located. The EU Regulation answers this question, at least in part: "In the
case of a company or legal person, the place of the registered office shall be
presumed 55 to be the centre of main interests in the absence of proof to the
contrary.5 6  Recital 13 of the preamble to the EU Regulation amplifies on this
concept as follows: "The 'centre of main interests' should correspond to the place
where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is
therefore ascertainable by third parties. 57
The EU Regulation gives critical importance to two factors in determining the
location of the CoMI. First, the CoMI is located at the place where the debtor
conducts the administration of its interests on a regular basis, which essentially
means the place where it administers its commercial, industrial, professional, and
general economic activities.58 Second, this is an objective test based on what is
apparent to third parties, and especially to creditors. 59 Thus, a creditor's view of
where the CoMI is located is an important factor. Miguel Virg6s and Etienne
'9 See id. It is noteworthy that, while the first purpose promotes a universalist perspective, the
second purpose is clearly territorial.
50 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, arts. 27-38.
st See id. art. 28.
52 See id.
13 See id. art. 33.
14 See id. art. 34.1.
55 Under the EU Regulation '(unlike U.S. law), the presumption that a corporate debtor's CoMI is
located at its place of registration carries some evidentiary weight: it is a factor that the court may
consider, along with the evidence presented, in determining the location of the debtor's CoMI. See In re
ci4net.com Inc., High Court, Ch. Div. (Companies Court), May 20, 2004; [2004] EWHC 1941 (Eng.);
Michael Raimon, Centres des Interets Principaux et Coordination des Proc6dures dans la Jurisprudence
Europ~en sur le Riglement Relatifaux Procedures d'lnsolvabilit6, 132 J. DROIT INT'L 739, 750 (2005).
56 See EU Regulation, supra note 9 art. 3.1.
57 Id. pmbl. 13. In EU law, the EU Regulation preambles have been treated as authoritative as the
main text of the regulation. See, e.g., In re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [20041 IESC 47, at 10, available at
http://www.courts.ie/judgments.nsf.
58 See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 75. Notably, if a court finds that a corporation's CoMI is
not located at its place of registration, its insolvency case will not be governed by the law of its country of
incorporation. See Raimon, supra note 55, at 750 (discussing cases). A debtor may not change its CoMI
after it has filed an insolvency case, even though the court has not yet issued an order opening the case.
See Case C-10/04, Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 WL 89153 (E.C.J. Jan. 17, 2006).
59 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl. (13).
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Schmit explain the rationale for this rule: "Insolvency is a foreseeable risk. It is
therefore important that international jurisdiction be based on a place known to the
debtor's potential creditors. This enables the legal risks which would have to be
assumed in the proceeding of insolvency to be calculated." 6 Under both the Model
Law and the EU Regulation, each company has a single CoMI, and can have only
one main proceeding.6'
Further, under the EU Regulation, the CoMI analysis must be made separately
for each legal entity.62 Except in a general way, the EU Regulation does not provide
for the coordination of the insolvency cases of related entities. More specifically, it
does not authorize the filing or opening of a main case for a particular company in a
specific country because a parent company or other affiliate has opened a main case
in that country.
III. THE EUROFOOD INSOLVENCY CASES
The Parmalat corporate empire collapsed in deep financial crisis in late 2003,63
with charges of massive financial fraud and the arrest in Italy of several of its
principal managers, including the two Italian directors of Eurofood.64 Regulatory,
legal and criminal charges remain pending in various countries, including Italy and
the United States.65 The fallout of the Parmalat SpA66 insolvency filing in Parma,
Italy in late 2003 led to the filing of insolvency proceedings for Eurofood, its Irish
subsidiary, in both Ireland and Italy, and to the international venue problems that
these filings created.
A. Parinalat's Collapse
Parmalat is one of the largest business failures in European history. While
beginning as a small, family-owned milk distribution company, the business grew
into an international dairy conglomerate operating in more than thirty countries, with
more than 30,000 employees and gross annual receipts exceeding E7.5 billion. 67 Its
principal subsidiary, Parmalat Finanziaria SpA, was listed on the Italian stock
exchange.
The background events leading to the filing of the involuntary bankruptcy
petition against Eurofood in Dublin played out over a period of approximately eight
weeks beginning on December 4, 2003, when the Parmalat Group defaulted on a
68large debenture due on that date because of an insuperable liquidity crisis.
60 See Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 1 75.
61 See, e.g., Andrd J. Berends, The Uncitral Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A
Comprehensive Overview, TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 309, 355 (1998).
62 See WESSELS, supra note 21, at 18-20; Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, T 76.
63 See Trib. Amm. Reg., 10 June 2004, n. 6998/2004, slip op. at 4 (on file with author) [hereinafter
Eurofood-Italy].
64 See In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., [2004] No. 33 cos (Dublin H. Ct.), slip op. at 3-4 [hereinafter
Eurofood-Dublin].
65 See id. at 4.
66 SpA is the Italian abbreviation for "societi per actione," the typical corporate form for a large
Italian corporation.
67 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 3-4.
68 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 63, slip op. at 4.
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Parmalat's announcement of this default on December 8 led to an international
financial crisis.
6 9
The Italian government responded on December 23 by issuing decree-law No.
70 71347, to amend its law providing for extraordinary administration of companies.
The new law permits a very rapid decision on the opening of an insolvency
proceeding for a debtor with at least a thousand employees and debts of at least El
billion.72 Only Parmalat and four or five other Italian companies (notably including
Fiat) meet the size requirements for extraordinary administration. Under the new
procedure, a company seeking extraordinary administration applies first to the
Minister of Productive Activities for admission into extraordinary administration.
73
Afterwards, a court must issue an order opening the insolvency proceeding upon a
finding that the company is insolvent.
74
Pursuant to the new law enacted on the previous day, on Christmas Eve 2003,
Parmalat SpA (Eurofood's parent) filed its request for extraordinary administration
with the Minister of Productive Activities. 75 The minister immediately granted the
request, and appointed Dr. Enrico Bondi as extraordinary administrator.76 On
December 27, the Parma court confirmed that Parmalat SpA was insolvent and
opened an extraordinary administration case for it.77 Five other Parmalat entities
filed extraordinary administration cases in Parma in the intervening month,
following the same procedure, and thirteen more filed by the time that Eurofood
filed its own case in Parma on February 9, 2004.78
69 It first appeared that approximately E4 billion were unaccounted for in the Parmalat empire. See
FACTBOX-Five Facts About the Parmalat Scandal, https//www.lexis.com/research (Sept. 28, 2005). It
turned out that the financial problems were more serious than was thought at that time. It is now reported
that Parmalat has approximately C20 billion in creditor claims, and expects to have assets of E3.7 billion
to E5 billion (of which E2 billion is expected in recoveries from litigation) from which to pay these claims.
See Fresh Milk: Parmalat Stock to Trade Again, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2005, at C l.
70 See Decreto-Legge 23 dicembre 2003, n. 347, Gazz. Uff. Dec. 24, 2003, n. 298, modified by
Legge 18 febbraio 2004, n. 39, Gazz. Uff. Feb. 20, 2004, n. 42, modified further by Legge 5 luglio 2004,
n. 166, Gazz. Uff. July 6, 2004, n. 156 [hereinafter Law 347/2003].
"' See Gazzetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana, [Gazz. Uff.] Aug. 9, 1999 no. 185, Legislazione
Italiana, [Lex] Parte I, Legislative Declaration, July 8, 1999 no. 270. Under the new law, a business must
either be reorganized pursuant to a plan within two years or sold in the first year. If neither goal is
reached, the business must be liquidated. See Luciano Panzani, Conflict of Jurisdiction in European
Cross Border Insolvency Law: The Eurofood Case (2004) (on file with author). Justice Panzani is a
member of the Italian Supreme Court, and the Judicial Member of the Italian commission that is drafting
revisions to the Italian insolvency law.
72 See Law 347/2003, supra note 70, art. I.
" See id. art. 2.
14 See id. art. 4.
75 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 4.
76 See id.
77 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 63, slip op. at 5. The proper Italian venue for a corporate
insolvency case is the court where the corporation is registered. Pursuant to typical European procedure,
corporations in Italy are registered with their local court.
78 See Avviso ai Creditori del Gruppo Parmalat, available at http://cp22.etdotcomit/it.
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B. The Eurofood Subsidiary
Eurofood was formed on November 5, 1997. 7 Its headquarters were located in
the International Finance Services Centre (hence the "IFSC" in Eurofood's name),
an urban renewal center located at Custom House Dock in Dublin. The center is
dedicated to businesses providing internationally traded financial services to non-
residents of Ireland.80 Each business at that location enjoys tax haven benefits not
available to other businesses in Ireland, and is subject to a number of conditions,
including certification by the Minister of Finance.8 ' Eurofood's certificate required
it to operate at that location, and limited its operating authority to providing
financing facilities to the Parmalat Group. 82 Because of its location and favored tax
status, Eurofood was required to obtain approval from the Ministry of Finance to
move its location or to make any change in management (including a change in its
directors).83 It was also subject to regulation by the Irish revenue authorities and the
Central Bank of Ireland.
Eurofood had no employees of its own. Its day-to-day administration was
conducted by Bank of America in Ireland pursuant to an administration agreement
that was governed by Irish law and contained an Irish jurisdiction clause. 4
Eurofood was subject to Irish accounting requirements, and its books and records
were maintained in Dublin.
85
Eurofood had engaged in only three financing transactions during its history.
The first two occurred in 1998. Eurofood issued notes for a private placement of
U.S. $80 million to provide collateral for a loan by Bank of America to finance
Parmalat operations in Venezuela.86 On the same date, Eurofood borrowed an
additional U.S. $100 million from a lending consortium headed by Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. to finance Parmalat business operations in Brazil.8 7 Finally, in 2001,
Eurofood engaged in a swap transaction with Bank of America for U.S. $2 million to
finance its operations in Ireland. 88 Eurofood's only substantial asset was a guarantee
of its debts by the Parmalat parent corporation, whose ability to deliver on these
guarantees was in deep question in early 2004.89
Until November 12, 2003, Eurofood had four directors, two Irish and two
Italian. All fifteen of its board of directors meetings were conducted in Dublin,
except for one that was conducted by a conference call.90 On November 12, one of
the Italian directors resigned, and the other resigned on January 20, 2004. Both were
79 For a summary of the Eurofood background, see Craig Martin, Eurofood Fight: Forum Shopping
Under The E.U. Regs, 24 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2005, at 36.go See In re Eurofood IFSC, Ltd., [2004] IESC 47, slip op. at 2 (Ir.) [hereinafter Eurofood-Ireland].
81 See id
82 See id.
83 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 2.
8 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, at 2.




89 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 3.
90 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, at 2-3.
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in Italian custody when the Eurofood winding up petition 9l was filed in Dublin on
January 27, 2004.92
C. The Irish Eurofood Proceeding in Dublin
Bank of America filed an involuntary winding up case for Eurofood under Irish
law in the Dublin High Court93 on January 27, 2004 and requested the appointment
of a temporary administrator.94 On the date of filing, Eurofood was hopelessly
insolvent 95 because of the serious doubt that Parmalat could honor its guarantee of
the Eurofood debt. Bank of America filed the case in part because Eurofood had
informed it that Parmalat may attempt to move its CoMI out of Ireland.96
On the same day, the Dublin High Court appointed Pearse Farrell as provisional
liquidator for Eurofood.97 Because the Dublin case for Eurofood was an involuntary
case, the Dublin court issued no order on that date to open a winding up of Eurofood.
The court also made no determination on the issue of whether the case was a "main
proceeding" within the meaning of the EU Regulation, or where Eurofood's CoMI
was located. The court set a further hearing on February 23, 2004 to take up these
issues after notice to the appropriate parties in interest.98
There are several reasons why Bank of America may have preferred a winding
up in Dublin to an extraordinary administration case in Italy. First, and probably
most important, they probably thought that the winding up of an Irish company
should be conducted by an Irish court under Irish law. Second, they were probably
more comfortable with a proceeding in a local court, before a judge with whom they
were familiar, handled by their local legal counsel. In contrast, a case in Italy would
require the hiring of Italian counsel, to proceed before a very junior and
inexperienced judge, and would be in a language that presumably they did not know.
Third, a Eurofood winding up case in Dublin would likely receive substantial
attention from the judge whereas Eurofood could become lost (as apparently actually
happened) among a hundred related companies in the Parma court, many of which
had far more pressing legal problems than Eurofood. Fourth, the Irish winding up
law is much more friendly to creditors such as Bank of America than the Italian
insolvency law.
9' A winding up under Irish law is a compulsory liquidation under the supervision of an Irish high
court. See Companies Act 1963, Act No. 33/1963, §§ 212-250, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.
ie.
92 See id. Eventually both directors (along with nine other Parmalat officials) arranged plea
bargains and received suspended prison sentences. See Eleven Convicts in Parmalat Fraud, A.P.
REUTERS, June 29, 2005, available at http:www.iht.com/articles/2005/06/28/business/parma.php.
93 Under the EU Regulation, a winding up under Irish law is one of the kinds of insolvency
proceedings that invokes the provisions of the Regulation. See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2(a),
app. A.
94 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 5.
9' See id. at 3.
96 See id at 4-5. Whether a court has jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings for a debtor that
moves its CoMI after the filing of a request to open a case, but before the court has acted on the request, is
before the ECJ. See Case C-1/04, In re Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, 2004 O.J. (C 71) 10.
9' See id.
" See Companies Act 1963, Act No. 33/1963 § 216, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie
(providing for a hearing).
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D. The Eurofood Proceeding in Parma
1. Procedure
Two days later, on January 29, 2004, Mr. Farrell gave notice of his appointment
to Dr. Bondi,99 who immediately took action in Italy. A week later, on February 5,
Dr. Bondi presented an application to Italy's Minister of Productive Activities for
Eurofood's admission into extraordinary administration under Italian law and his
appointment as administrator.' Although informed of the pending Irish proceeding
for Eurofood, the Minister granted the application on February 9.
On February 10, the next day, Dr. Bondi filed a proceeding in Parma for
Eurofood' °' as a companion to the nineteen other proceedings for Parmalat-related
entities then pending. The court in Parma immediately set a hearing on Tuesday,
February 17 at noon on opening the Eurofood proceeding, and particularly to
determine whether Eurofood was insolvent.'0 2 The court further ordered Dr. Bondi
to give notice of the hearing to "interested parties."'0 3 On February 12, Dr. Bondi
filed a report with the Parma court on Eurofood,' °4 but he did not provide a copy to
Mr. Farrell.
0 5
Also on February 10, Dr. Bondi removed one of Eurofood's two Irish directors
(a lawyer in Dublin), and appointed three new Italian directors. 0 6  Even though
Eurofood's Irish license to operate required approval from the Irish Department of
Finance for any change in directors, Dr. Bondi did not seek such approval.
Apparently, the new board took no action relevant to the opening of main
proceedings for Eurofood in either Ireland or Italy.
On February 16, 2004, Farrell filed a motion in the Dublin court requesting
permission to participate in the Parma hearing and for an earlier hearing on the Irish
winding up petition. The court granted him permission to travel to Italy, but refused
to advance its own hearing.
0 7
99 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 63, slip op. at 5.
10See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 8. Eurofood did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements for extraordinary administration under Italian law: a thousand employees and annual
revenues of a hundred billion euros. However, under Italian law (which is similar to 28 U.S.C. § 1408
(2005)), once a qualifying corporation is admitted to extraordinary administration, any related business
entity in the corporate enterprise is permitted to file in the same court. See Law 347/2003, supra note 70,
art. 3 (as amended); Eurofood-Italy, 3, supra note 63, slip op. at 15.
101 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 8.
102 Under subsequent Italian law, the court has only five days in which to make a decision on the
opening of a proceeding for extraordinary administration. See Law 347/2003 (as amended), supra note
70, § 4; Panzani, supra note 71, at 4.
1o3 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 9 (quoting from March 1, 2004 affidavit filed by
Francesco Gianni on behalf of Dr. Bondi).
1' See Eurofood-ltaly, supra note 63, slip op. at 5; Martin, supra note 79, at 36.
105 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, at 15 (opinion by Justice Fennelly); Eurofood A.G. Report,
supra note 28, 39.
10' It is not known whether the new directors met or whether the new board of directors approved the
extraordinary administration filing for Eurofood. While any such approval would have to have been after
the fact, the Italian law (like typical U.S. corporate laws) may authorize retroactive board approval of
corporate actions. This issue was not discussed in the Eurofood judicial decision.
"" See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 10.
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2. Decision of the Parma court
On Friday, February 20, the Parma court issued its ruling opening an
extraordinary administration proceeding for Eurofood on the grounds that it was
clearly insolvent.'
0 8
In order to open a proceeding for extraordinary administration, the Parma court
had to find that it had jurisdiction, which Mr. Farrell disputed. The Parma court
found Italian jurisdiction, based on Italian law permitting the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation if its administrative headquarters or principal purposes are
located in Italy.' 0 9 The court found that the activity of Eurofood management and
the "propelling center of the enterprise" was located in Parma. The court based this
decision on a distinction between "executive administrators," who were the two
Italian directors, and "non-executive administrators," who were the Irish directors. 0
Based on Dr. Bondi's evidence (which likely was very different from that presented
to the Dublin court), the Parma court found, in fact, that the real management of
Eurofood was conducted in Parma."' In addition, the court found that the economic
purpose of Eurofood was entirely tied to the Parmalat corporate group based in
Parma.' 2 The court found that creditors of Eurofood should not be surprised with an
Italian court taking jurisdiction over its insolvency proceeding, because Eurofood
was essentially an "empty box," and its only asset was the corporate guarantee of its
Italian parent Parmalat SpA," 3 whose "mother proceeding" was located in Italy."
4
The Parma court found unpersuasive Mr. Farrell's argument that Eurofood was
incorporated in Ireland and that it was managed there pursuant to a management
agreement with Bank of America. The court found this to be only a "logistical
agreement," and opined that the court should look at the substance of the
administration, not its form." 5 In contrast, the court found that Eurofood was:
simply a conduit for the financial policy of Parmalat S.p.A .... with the
exclusive aim of facilitating flows of money with the group with a view to
an undisputed tax advantage... but as its exclusive point of reference the




8 See In re Eurofood IFSC Ltd., Parma Civil & Criminal Court, Feb. 19, 2004, slip. op. at 10-1 1
(unpublished opinion on file with author) [hereinafter Eurofood-Parma]. It is difficult to determine
precisely what the Parma court decided. It never clearly states its conclusions on the important issues. Its
decision is very poorly written, and the sentences are very long and convoluted. The main analysis
consists in three sentences that take nearly two full pages.
'09 See id. at 2.
"°See id. at 3-4. The court gave no legal basis for making such a distinction. There is no support
for such a distinction in Irish law, under which Eurofood was incorporated.
. See id. at 4.
112 See id. at 5. A consideration of the relations between Eurofood and the other Parmalat entities is
not legitimate under the EU Regulation. See infra text accompanying notes 295-300; see also Virg6s &
Schmit, supra note 28, 76. I recommend that the EU Regulation be amended to accommodate the joint
needs in the insolvency context of corporate groups. See infra text accompanying notes 295-304.
113 See Eurofood-Parma, supra note 108, slip op. at 5-6.
14 See id. at 10.
... See id. at 7.
116 See id. at 8.
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The court found that the controlling authority for the enterprise was located in
Italy."17 Thus, the Parma court effectively found that Eurofood's CoMI was located
in Italy, and it could open a main proceeding for Eurofood.
The court in Parma further found that the proceeding in Dublin had not
progressed to the point where the EU Regulation would prevent the opening of a
main proceeding for Eurofood in Italy. The mere filing of the Irish proceeding and
the appointment of a provisional liquidator, in the court's view, did not constitute an
"opening" of the proceeding, as defined in EU Regulation Article 3(3), tI8 that
required recognition under EU Regulation Article 16.
E. Subsequent Irish Proceedings
I. The Dublin High Court Decision
After the Parma decision on Friday, February 20, the Dublin High Court heard
the application for opening a main proceeding for Eurofood on March 2-4, 2004 and
handed down its decision to open the proceeding on March 23, 2004. This opinion
seethes with disapproval of the procedures followed in the Parma court.
The Dublin High Court held that Eurofood's CoMI was located in Ireland, and
that the Irish proceeding was the main proceeding for Eurofood. Two elements are
required, the court held, to give rise to the opening of main proceedings in an
insolvency proceeding in Ireland: first, the CoM1 must be located in Ireland; second,
the insolvency proceedings must actually be opened in Ireland." 9
a. Time of Opening of Proceeding in Dublin
Taking the second point first, the court found that an insolvency proceeding, as
defined in the EU Regulation, was opened in Ireland on January 27, 2004. The court
arrived at this conclusion on two grounds. First, it found that the appointment of a
provisional liquidator on that date was a "judgment" within the meaning of the EU
Regulation 20 for the purposes of the provision on opening a main proceeding.' 2'
Second, the court found that its March 23 decision to open a main proceeding
for Eurofood related back to the January 27 date, and thus required recognition by
the Parma court pursuant to Article 16.1.122 Article 16.1 requires the courts of any
other EU country to recognize a judgment, from a court with jurisdiction, that opens
a main proceeding "from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the
opening of proceedings." By virtue of the relation back rule in the Irish Companies
"' See id. at 7-8.
'8 EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3(3). Article 3(3) provides in relevant part: "Where insolvency
proceedings have been opened under paragraph I, any proceedings opened subsequently under paragraph
2 shall be secondary proceedings."
"9 See Eurofood-Parma, supra note 108, slip op. at 21.
121 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 2(e).
12 Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 21-22. Accord Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28,
147 ("It is sufficient for [a judgment] to have effect in the State of opening and for its effects not to have
been stayed.").
1
22 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 16.1.
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Act,'23 even the March 23 decision took effect as of January 27, according to the
Dublin court. 124 Thus its January 27 decision, in its view, predated the decision of
the court in Parma.
25
As to the location of Eurofood's CoMI, the Italian administrator argued that the
Irish court failed to make any finding on this subject in its January 27 hearing. The
Dublin court found that it was not necessary to make an express declaration on this
subject, if, in fact, the CoMI was located in Ireland. 126  This determination was
implicit, the court found, in its determination to appoint a provisional liquidator on
that date. 1
27
b. Location of CoM! in Ireland
The Dublin court began its discussion on Eurofood's CoMI by observing that it
enjoyed the presumption that it was located in Ireland because Eurofood's registered
office was in Ireland at all relevant times. 28 The CoMI normally corresponds to the
location of the debtor's head office.
129
Any further consideration of this issue, according to the court, must consider
that this center should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis, and therefore is ascertainable by
third parties, and especially by potential creditors. 130 All of the evidence before the
Dublin court indicated that the actual creditors considered Eurofood to have its
CoMI in Ireland. These creditors were not heard at all, the court noted, by the Parma
court.13 1 The clear perception of the existing creditors of Eurofood, according to
their evidence, was that they were dealing with investments issued by a company
located in Ireland that was subject to Irish fiscal and regulatory provisions.1
3 2
Given its finding that it was the first to open a main proceeding for Eurofood,
the Dublin court found that the court in Parma lacked jurisdiction to open a main
proceeding for the same company.
133
The Dublin court also found that the public policy exception in Article 26
applied in the Eurofood proceeding. In particular, the European Convention on
123 See Companies Act 1963 (Act No. 33/1963 § 216, available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie
(providing for a hearing).
124 This relation back rule, the court noted, mirrored a similar provision in the law of England and
Wales. See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 22.
125 The Eurofood A.G. opinion, filed in the ECJ case, articulates a third ground for finding that the
Dublin case was opened on January 27, 2004. Section 220 of the Irish Companies Act, 1963, the opinion
points out, provides that the winding up of a company is deemed to commence at the time of presentation
of a petition for winding up (absent a prior resolution passed by the company). See Eurofood A.G.
Report, supra note 28, 22, 93.
126 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 23.
127 This reasoning is quite questionable. A secondary proceeding may be opened before a main
proceeding, under the EU Regulation. See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3.4. A liquidator is clearly
needed in a secondary proceeding, because it must be a liquidation. See id. art. 3.3. Thus, the
appointment of a liquidator is ambiguous as to whether the proceeding is a main or a secondary
proceeding.
128 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 23.
129 See id at 25 (citing Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28).
3
o See id. at 23-24.
131 See id at 27.
132 See id.
"3 See id at 29.
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Human Rights includes the right to a fair hearing, which the Parma court violated in
failing to give the creditors an opportunity to be heard, and failing to give either the
creditors or the Irish provisional liquidator sufficient notice of the hearing in order to
prepare a defense.1
34
2. The Irish Supreme Court Decision
Dr. Bondi took an appeal to the Irish Supreme Court of the Eurofood-Dublin
decision. Acting very quickly, on July 27, 2004, the Irish Supreme Court issued an
opinion in two parts (Eurofood-Ireland) 35 The Supreme Court considered three
main issues: first, whether insolvency proceedings had been opened first in Ireland
or in Italy; second, whether Eurofood's CoMI was in Ireland or in Italy; and third,
whether there was such an absence of fair procedures in the Parma court that its
decision should not be recognized in Ireland.
136
It was generally agreed, the Court stated, that the Court would be required to
refer certain questions relating to these issues to the Court of Justice for the
European Community. 137 To assist the Court of Justice in deciding these issues, the
Supreme Court made rulings on relevant facts and issues of Irish law.
138
a. Factual Determinations
The Irish Supreme Court found that the only disputed issue of fact was the
extent to which the Eurofood board of directors meetings were in Dublin. While Dr.
Bondi disputed whether many of the meetings were held in Dublin, the Court found
the evidence overwhelming that the meetings were properly and regularly held in
Dublin, and that Dr. Bondi had provided no evidence to support his contention
otherwise. 1
39
In addition, Dr. Bondi contended that the two Italian directors were "executive"
directors, while the two Irish directors were "non-executive" directors.' 40 The Court
found no basis for this distinction, either in law or in the corporation's articles of
association. 
41'
b. Opening of Main Insolvency Proceedings
The first issue addressed by the Irish Supreme Court was at what time, under the
Irish procedure utilized in the Eurofood proceeding, the winding up proceeding was
"opened" under Irish law, for the purposes of the EU Regulation. In the Irish
Supreme Court's view, there were two ways in which the Irish winding up petition
1
34 See id. at 30-32.
135 See Eurofood-lreland, supra note 80, slip op. at 2.
136 See id. at 5.
137 See id. at 6.
3 See id. at 7.
"9 See id. at 7-8.
140 The Parma court in the Eurofood-Parma proceeding had found that the Italian directors were
"executive directors" and that the Irish directors were "non-executive directors." See Eurofood-Parma,
supra note 108, slip op. at 3-4; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
'41 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 8.
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could have taken priority over the Italian petition. First, the decision appointing a
provisional liquidator may constitute a "judgment opening insolvency proceedings"
for the purposes of Article 16.142 Alternatively, the Dublin court's later decision to
order a winding up relates back to the date of presentation of the petition.143 In
either case, the applicable date would be January 27, 2004, which was before the
petition was presented in Parma, and the Italian court would be required to recognize
the prior Irish court decision to open a main proceeding for Eurofood.
The court found that, under Irish law, the legal effects of a winding up
proceeding (which was filed against Eurofood, and which is a proceeding subject to
the EU Regulation) 144 are "deemed to commence at the time of the presentation of
the petition for the winding up.' ' 145 While recognizing that a winding up may not be
ordered even though a petition has been filed or a provisional liquidator has been
appointed, the Court found that a proceeding is deemed to have been opened on the
date of the presentation of the petition, provided that the court subsequently issues a
winding up order.
46
The Irish Supreme Court found the EU Regulation less than clear on the issue of
when an insolvency proceeding is opened, such that the opening is entitled to
community-wide recognition. 47  Article 16 provides for the recognition of a
"judgment opening insolvency proceedings." The Irish Supreme Court found some
ambiguity in the meaning of this phrase, because it does not exactly match the
definitions in Article 2. Article 2(e) provides that a "judgment" in relation to the
opening of insolvency proceedings or the appointment of a liquidator shall include
the decision of any court empowered to open such proceedings or to appoint a
liquidator." While an Irish provisional liquidator clearly qualifies as a liquidator
under this provision, Article 2(e) does not refer to a "judgment appointing a
liquidator." The question, in the Court's view, then, was whether an order
appointing a provisional liquidator constituted a judgment opening the proceeding
that was subject to recognition under Article 16. The court found that it required a
preliminary ruling from the ECJ on this issue.
c. Center of Main Interests
In contrast, the Irish Supreme Court found the evidence overwhelming that
Eurofood's CoMI was located in Ireland at all relevant times. 48 While this is
governed by EU law, the Court found that this is predominantly a matter of fact (on
which the trial court's decision is entitled to greater deference), and that the facts
before the Dublin court were clear.
149
The Court pointed to the applicable EU Regulation provision, Article 3.1, which
states:
'42See id. at 9-10.
143 See id.
114 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, Annex A.
1'5 See Eurofood-freland, supra note 80, slip op. at I I (quoting the Companies Act 1963 § 220(2)).
'46 See id. at 10.
141 See id. at 9-10.
148 See id. at 10-11.
149 See id.
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The court of the Member State within the territory of which the centre of a
debtor's main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open
insolvency proceedings. In the case of a company or legal person, the
place of the registered offices shall be presumed to be the centre of its
main interests in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Further, the Court noted that Recital 13 states: "The 'centre of main interests'
should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his
interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertainable by third parties."
The Court found two elements in Recital 13: As to the place of the
administration of its interests on a regular basis, the court found the evidence
overwhelming that all of Eurofood's administration of its interests took place in
Ireland. 50 Indeed, Dr. Bondi did not even contest that Eurofood conducted the
administration of its interests in Ireland, except with respect to some of the meeting
of its board of directors, and the Court found his evidence insubstantial.' 5'
The second element is that the CoMl should be ascertainable by third parties,
and especially by creditors. The creditors in this proceeding presented detailed
evidence of the lengths to which they went to satisfy themselves that the Eurofood's
CoMI was in Ireland.
52
The Irish Supreme Court was very troubled by Bondi's response on these issues.
Bondi relied on five arguments, the Court found. 5 3 First, Eurofood was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Parmalat. Second, its sole purpose was to provide financing for
companies in the Parmalat Group. Third, company policy was decided at Parmalat
headquarters in Italy, by Parmalat executives and Eurofood exercised no independent
decision-making. Fourth, Eurofood had no employees in Ireland. 5 4  Fifth,
Eurofood's liability to its creditors was guaranteed by Parmalat.
The Court found these arguments troubling because they were "deeply inimical
to the need for respect for separate corporate identity and respect for the rules of law
(including Community law rules) relating to companies that the separate existence of
such companies should be ignored."' 55 Essentially, Dr. Bondi's argument was that
Eurofood was operated as an agency of Parmalat, and did not have functional
separate existence. If the test were ultimate financial control, rather than legal and
corporate existence, the Court stated, this would have "very serious implications for
the future of international corporate structures ... .
d. Recognition of the Parma Decision Opening a Main Proceeding for Eurofood
In a separate opinion, the Irish Supreme Court decided that recognition of the
decision of the Italian court would be contrary to Irish public policy.' 5 7 The relevant
principle of Irish law, the Court found, is the principal requiring fair procedures in
all judicial and administrative proceedings, which has both common law and
0°See id.
151 See id.
52 See id. at 11.
153 See id.
154 In fact, Eurofood had no employees at all.
155 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 11.
6 See id
"' See id. at 13-20.
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constitutional foundations.158  This fairness requirement includes a right to
reasonable notice of the nature of the decision at issue and the evidence on which it
is sought.15 9  If an Irish court would find the procedures inadequate for an Irish
judicial or administrative body, the Court held, the decision of a foreign court
suffering from the same procedural irregularities should not be recognized. 16o
The Irish Supreme Court was particularly disturbed by the fact that Dr. Bondi
made no effort to contest any of the facts found by the Dublin High Court on the due
process violations in the Parma court proceeding. 161 It was uncontested that Dr.
Bondi failed to serve the Irish provisional administrator with copies of the Parma
petition or other papers, despite several verbal and written requests for them. The
administrator complained that he was significantly hindered in making his
presentation to the Parma court for lack of these documents. Further, with full
knowledge of these complaints, Dr. Bondi's counsel appeared in the Irish Supreme
Court with no explanation for this conduct. 62  "It is not possible," the Court
responded, "to refrain from ctiticising the behaviour of the Appellant in the strongest
terms."'
16 3
Even recognizing the need for urgent action in a large insolvency proceeding,
the Irish Supreme Court found that if Dr. Bondi had failed to provide copies of his
documents in the same manner in an Irish court, the resulting decision, taken without
providing fair procedures, would be so manifestly contrary to public policy in
Ireland, that it would be void under the Irish law. 64
The Irish Supreme Court recognized, however, that Irish public policy is not
decisive on its obligation to recognize the decision of the Italian court. The EU
Regulation is a matter of EU law, which takes priority over Irish law. Thus, the
Court decided, it must defer to the Court of Justice for a ruling on the application of
the EU Regulation to this issue.
165
e. Reference to the European Court of Justice
Based on the analyses described above, the Irish Supreme Court determined that
it could not decide the appeal in the Eurofood proceeding without first referring
66
five issues to the ECJ.16  The ECJ is the supreme court for the determination of
'
56 See id. at 17.
159 See id.
'60 See id
161 See id. at 18.




4 See id; accord Panzani, supra note 71, at 4.
1
65 See id. at 19-20.
166 Article 234 of the EC Treaty provides: "The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give
preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty ...." See Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, art. 234 [hereinafter EC Treaty]. Article 234
further authorizes any court or tribunal of a Member State, "if it considers that a decision on the question
is necessary to enable it to give judgment, [to] request the Court of Justice to give a ruling" on such a
question. See id. Such a reference in the ECJ is mandatory in a case pending before a national court of
last resort. See id.
167 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 11-13; see also Case C-341/04, In re Eurofood
IFSC Ltd., 2004 O.J. (C 251) 7 (acknowledging the filing of the questions referred by the Irish Supreme
Court).
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questions on the interpretation of the EU Regulation. 68 The Court has jurisdiction
to review issues under the EU Convention only upon reference of a national court of
last resort, 69 and then only if the court considers that a decision of the ECJ is
necessary for the national court to give judgment in a matter pending before it.1
70
Decisions of the Court are binding on the national court that has requested its
opinion. 17
The first issue is whether the January 27, 2004 proceedings in the Dublin court
constituted a judgment opening an insolvency proceeding, within the meaning of the
EU Regulation. 172  Secondly, the Court inquired whether, if the January 27
proceedings were not sufficient to constitute such a judgment, the relation back
provision in the Irish Companies Act made the commencement effective as of
January 27.173 Third, the Court inquired whether the Parma court had jurisdiction to
open main insolvency proceedings where the company is registered in Ireland and
conducts its interests there on a regular basis.' 74 Fourth, the Court inquired which
factors control the location of a company's CoMI where it conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis in Ireland, but its parent corporation
in Italy can and does control policy for the subsidiary. 75 Finally, the Court asked
168 See MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 2.29.
'69 See Treaty of Amsterdam, Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, art. 68; Moss ET AL.,
supra note 21, 2.32.
170 In this circumstance, it is mandatory for the national court of last resort to make a reference to the
ECJ. See EC Treaty art. 68.
171 See id.
172 The Court formulated the issue as follows:
Where a petition is presented to a court of competent jurisdiction in Ireland for the
winding up of an insolvent company and that court makes an order, pending the
making of an order for winding up, appointing a provisional liquidator with powers
to take possession of the assets of the company, manage its affairs, open a bank
account and appoint a solicitor all with the effect in law of depriving the directors
of the company of power to act, does that order combined with the presentation of
the petition constitute a judgment opening of insolvency proceedings for the
purposes of Article 16, interpreted in the light of Articles I and 2, of Council
Regulation (EC) No 1346 of 2000?
Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 12.
173 The Court framed the issue as follows:
If the answer to Question I is in the negative, does the presentation, in Ireland, of a
petition to the High Court for the compulsory winding up of a company by the
court constitute the opening of insolvency proceedings for the purposes of that
Regulation by virtue of the Irish legal provision (section 220(2) of the Companies
Act, 1963) deeming the winding up of the company to commence at the date of the
presentation of the petition?
ld.
74 The Court framed this inquiry as follows:
Does Article 3 of the said Regulation, in combination with Article 16, have the
effect that a court in a Member State other than that in which the registered office
of the company is situated and other than where the company conducts the
administration of its interests on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by third
parties, but where insolvency proceedings are first opened has jurisdiction to open
main insolvency proceedings?
Id.
75The Court posed the question this way:
Where (a) the registered offices of a parent company and its subsidiary are in two
different member states, (b) the subsidiary conducts the administration of its
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the ECJ to determine whether the Irish courts could invoke the public policy
exception in the EU Regulation to deny recognition to the opening of insolvency
proceedings in Parma where the rights to fair procedures and a fair hearing were
violated and, in particular, the provisional administrator was denied copies of the
essential papers.
76
These issues remain pending before the ECJ. The Irish Supreme court declared
that, "it is a matter of great urgency to have rulings on these questions," and
requested that the Court of Justice give special priority to them. 77 However, the
ECJ denied urgent review.'
The decision of the ECJ could be very helpful in interpreting the CoMI
provisions in the EU Regulation. The court's decision could clarify the application
of the definition and could determine what is necessary for a "judgment opening
insolvency proceedings" under Article 16.1 of the EU Regulation. The case was
argued on June 12, 2005,179 and a decision is expected in 2006.180
F. The Italian Court of Appeals Decision
Mr. Farrell, acting for Eurofood and Bank of America, took appeals of all of the
relevant decisions as to both Eurofood and Parmalat SpA issued by the Minister of
Productive Activities and the Parma court, and requested that all of these decisions
interests on a regular basis in a manner ascertainable by third parties and in
complete and regular respect for its own corporate identity in the member state
where its registered office is situated and (c) the parent company is in a position, by
virtue of its shareholding and power to appoint directors, to control and does in fact
control the policy of the subsidiary, in determining the "centre of main interests,"
are the governing factors those referred to at (b) above or on the other hand those
referred to at (c) above?
Id. at 12-13.
176 The Court framed the last question as follows:
Where it is manifestly contrary to the public policy of a Member State to permit a
judicial or administrative decision to have legal effect in relation persons or bodies
whose right to fair procedures and a fair hearing has not been respected in reaching
such a decision, is that Member State bound, by virtue of Article 17 of the said
Regulation, to give recognition to a decision of the courts of another Member State
purporting to open insolvency proceedings in respect of a company, in a situation
where the court of the first Member State is satisfied that the decision in question
has been made in disregard of those principles and, in particular, where the
applicant in the second Member State has refused, in spite of requests and contrary
to the order of the court of the second Member State, to provide the provisional
liquidator of the company, duly appointed in accordance with the law of the first
Member State, with any copy of the essential papers grounding the application?
Id. at 13.
7 See Eurofood-lreland, supra note 80, slip op. at 12.
1
75 See Case C-341/04, Bondi v. Bank of America (Sept. 15, 2004), available at http://curia.eu.int/
en/contentljuris.
'7 Eight countries (including Ireland and Italy), as well as the EU Commission, filed written
observations with the ECJ, and all but three were represented at the hearing. See Eurofood A.G. Report,
supra note 28, 45.
'0 The advocate general of the ECJ issued an opinion on September 27, 2005 that recommended that
the Court issue a preliminary opinion that the Irish courts should administer the Eurofood insolvency case.
See id.
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be annulled. The Italian appellate court heard oral argument on June 10, 2004 and
dismissed the appeals by both parties by judgment filed on July 16.'
s
8
The court noted that, if the appeal were successful, the Parma proceedings
would become secondary proceedings; if not, the Irish proceedings were secondary
proceedings.18 2 The court also found it significant that the Irish proceedings were
brought by creditors for the sole purpose of winding up the business of Eurofood,
with no concern for a possible rescue of the enterprise.
8 3
The appellate court found that the opening of an Italian extraordinary
administration proceeding is a two-step process: first, the minister's issuance of a
decree admitting a company into extraordinary administration and, second, the
court's finding that the debtor is insolvent and establishing procedures for the
proceeding.' 4 For Eurofood, the first step took place on February 9 and the second
on February 20, 2004.
The court further found that, for the purposes of mandatory recognition under
the EU Regulation,185 no proceeding for Eurofood had yet been opened in Ireland by
those dates. The Dublin decision of January 27, 2004 was too limited to constitute
the "opening" of a proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Irish law, according to
the court, because the Dublin court had only appointed a provisional liquidator as a
precautionary measure without going into the merits even in a summary manner.'
8 6
The Italian appellate court found that the March 15, 2004 Dublin decision, even if
retroactive, could not take precedence over the February decisions in the Parma
court, which were already in full effect.18 7 Thus, the court found, it did not matter
whether the Irish court correctly determined on March 15 that Eurofood's CoMI was
located in Ireland (a view with which the Italian appellate court disagreed). 8 8
The court of appeal further found that the Italian legislature properly enacted the
December 23, 2003 legislation to deal with the financial crisis of large groups of
companies "that are global both in orientation and in location,"'8 9 and granted the
Minister of Productive Activities the power to admit a company into extraordinary
administration solely on the basis of its control relationship with its parent, to
promote the uniform reorganization of companies in the group, all of which are
caught up in the parent corporation's financial difficulty. 90
The court of appeal rejected the bank's challenge to the admission of Eurofood
into extraordinary administration without notice to creditors, on the grounds that the
minister's decree to admit Eurofood into extraordinary administration was a matter
of utmost urgency that could not await formalities of notice,' 9' and that, in any event,
'81 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 63, slip op.




... See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 16(l).
18 See Eurofood-laly, slip op. at 10-11.
'
8 7Seeid at 12.
"' See id.
89 See id. at 15.
'90 See id.
19' See id. at 24.
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the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding is not subject to objection by creditors.1
92
Creditors could seek an appropriate remedy, the court said, after the proceeding is
initiated.' 93
The court also found that the extraordinary administrator properly has the power
to request extraordinary administration for subsidiary companies because of the need
for uniform management of the businesses belonging to the group. 194 The court
further found that, given the public interest in maintaining a large business subject to
extraordinary administration (the five or six largest in Italy), "there is an obvious and
undeniable need not to dissipate the economic worth underlying the Group, which
cannot be effectively realised without a single insolvency procedure and uniform
management of each and every business, irrespective of the scale of the subsidiary
enterprises."
195
All of the evidence indicates that the Irish Supreme Court had no knowledge of
this Italian appellate opinion when it issued its own opinion on July 27, 2004. There
is no reference to this decision, or even to the fact of the appeal of the Parma court's
decision, in either of two decisions that the Irish Supreme Court issued on July 27.
IV. THE DAISYTEK PROCEEDINGS
The Daisytek corporate group was a global distributor of computer supplies and
professional tape products.' 96 Its European subsidiaries were resellers and wholesale
distributors of electronic office supplies throughout Europe.
197
In early 2003, Daisytek defaulted on financial covenants in its secured credit
facility with its bank group, headed by Bank of America. 98 This default precipitated
a severe downturn in the liquidity of the Daisytek corporate group, and ultimately
led to the filing of bankruptcy proceedings in the United States, England, France,
and Germany.199
A controversy quickly ensued over which court, the English or the French court,
should conduct the main reorganization proceeding for Daisytek-France. A similar
dispute arose between the English and the German courts over which court should
preside over the main proceedings for two of the German subsidiaries.
192 See id. U.S. law is similar. A creditor may move for the dismissal of a bankruptcy proceeding on
a variety of grounds. See, e.g., I I U.S.C. §§ 707(a) (liquidation case), 1112(b) (reorganization case).
However, no creditor is permitted to object at the outset to a voluntary filing by the debtor.
193 See Eurofood-ltaly, supra note 63, slip op. at 24. The procedure is the same in the United States.




'96 See Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Daisytek, Inc. (In re Daisytek, Inc.), No. 03-34762-HDH-I I, 2004 WL
1698284, I (N.D. Tex. July 29, 2004) [hereinafter Daisytek-US].
19 See In re Daisytek-ISA Ltd., [2003] B.C.C. 562, [2004] B.P.I.R. 30, 2003 WL 21353254 Ch.
Leeds. (May 16, 2003) (UK), at * I [hereinafter Daisytek-Leeds].
' See Daisytek-US, 2004 WL 1698284, 1.
'99 See id.
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A. The U.S. Cases
The bankruptcy of the Daisytek corporate empire began with the filing of eight
voluntary chapter 11 cases200 in the bankruptcy court in Dallas, Texas on May 7,
2003. The Dallas filing of a chapter II case for the overall holding company,
Daisytek International, Inc., followed on June 3, 2003. These cases were all
administratively consolidated and remain pending in Dallas.2°'
The Dallas filing did not include any of Daisytek's sixteen European
subsidiaries. Daisytek made a separate filing for the European entities in England on
May 16. This Article focuses on the European Daisytek insolvency cases.
B. The English Proceedings
Daisytek had sixteen subsidiaries (the European group) with registered offices in
the EU: twelve in the United Kingdom (ten in England, one in Scotland, and one in
Northern Ireland), three in Germany, and one in France. The European group was a
reseller and wholesale distributor of electronic office supplies throughout Europe. 20 2
Approximately half of the group's sales were to large and small retailers in the
European market and half of the sales were to end users. 203  None of these
corporations was included in the Dallas bankruptcy filings.
On May 16, nine days after the filings in Dallas, Daisytek filed proceedings in
the Leeds English High Court in for the sixteen members of the European group and
requested administration204 of each of the corporate entities under Section 8 of the
Insolvency Act of 1986 for England and Wales.20 5 The purpose of the petitions for
administration was to achieve a more advantageous realization of their assets than
200 The chapter I i cases in Dallas were filed for Daisytek, Inc., Arlington Industries, Inc., Daisytek
Latin America, Inc., Tapebargains.com. Inc., Virtual Demand, Inc., B.A. Pargh Co., The Tape Co., and
Digital Storage, Inc. There is also an adversary proceeding on file in the Dallas court against Daisytek
Canada, Inc., which is apparently a member of the corporate group for which no bankruptcy case has been
filed. For a reported opinion arising in the Dallas proceedings reported in Westlaw, see Daisytek-U.S,
2004 WL 1698284.
201 Joint administration, also known as administrative consolidation or procedural consolidation, is
common for cases involving two or more affiliated corporations or other related entities that have filed
bankruptcy cases. Joint administration typically involves the maintenance of a single case file, claims
register, and docket in the clerk's office, the combining of notices concerning the case, and the use of a
consolidated service list for pleadings and papers filed in the case. See, e.g., Gill v. Sierra Pac. Const.,
Inc. (In re Parkway Calabasas, Ltd.), 89 B.R. 832, 836 (Bankr. C.D. Cal 1988), rev'd, B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1990 (unpublished opinion), rev'd, 949 F.2d 1058 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting trial court opinion); see also
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1015 advisory committee note. Under administrative consolidation, the separate
identities of each of the corporate entities is maintained. See id. Corporations in bankruptcy can be
merged under U.S. law pursuant to an order for substantive consolidation, which is an entirely different
procedure. For a comprehensive discussion of substantive consolidation, see In re Owens Coming, 419
F.3d 195, 205-12 (3d Cir. 2005).
202 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 11.
203 See id.
204 "Administration" is the most common English process for corporate reorganization. It differs
substantially from reorganization under chapter I I in the United States. In addition, the administration
process in England has been revised extensively since the filing of the Daisytek European group
proceedings. See RICHARD F. BRAUDE ET AL., COLLIER INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INSOLVENCY GUIDE
121.05[3] (2003).
205 See Insolvency Act 1986 c 45, pt. 11, s 8 (Eng.).
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would be achieved in a winding-up or the continued survival of some or all of the
parts.2°6
Daisytek presumably filed the cases in England because the English courts do
not recognize the U.S. automatic stay. An additional reason, presumably, for filing
in England was to take advantage of the EU-wide effect of the English automatic
stay.2 °7 The French and German proceedings were also presumably filed in England
to achieve administrative economies for the reorganization of the related entities in a
single court with the British entities.
The Leeds court was satisfied that the English law requirements were met for
commencing administration proceedings for the fourteen companies admitted into
administration. Each was insolvent or likely to become insolvent soon.2 °8 In
addition, the court found that administration would likely produce a greater
realization of assets for each entity.20 9
The corporate structure of the European Daisytek group is complex. 2'0 Daisytek
ISA is the holding company for the group. Its sole immediate subsidiary is ISA
International plc (International), located in Bradford, England. International, in turn,
is the immediate holding company of ISA International Holdings Ltd. (International
Holdings), the holding company for the non-English companies. Thus, International
Holdings was the parent corporation for Daisytek-France, the French operating
company and for PAR Beteiligungs GmbH (PAR), the German holding company for
the two German operating companies.
Six of the sixteen companies were dormant. These included four immediate
subsidiaries of International, and two subsidiaries of ISA Wholesale plc (Wholesale),
which was the English trading company in the European group. The Leeds High
Court found that each of the dormant companies was insolvent because, although
lacking assets, each had given guarantees to the main European group financiers,
GMAC Commercial Finance plc and Barclays Bank plc, for debts owing by other
group members.
The employees in the European group were concentrated in five corporations.
Wholesale employed four hundred and fifty people and operated nine offices in the
British Isles (including two in Dublin, Ireland).2 " Daisytek-France had one hundred
and forty-five employees in France.2 12 The two German trading subsidiaries had an
undisclosed number of employees in Germany. International apparently had a
handful of employees in Bradford to provide administrative services for the other
entities.
According to the findings of the Leeds High Court, International performed the
head office functions for the European group, which included the negotiation of
supply contracts with major suppliers. International had given guarantees to major
20
6 See Daisylek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 1.
207 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
208 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 2,4.
209 See id.
210 For a description of the European corporate structure for Daisytek, see id. at * 1-2. The
organizational structure of the entire corporate empire is depicted in Appendix A.
211 See id. at *2.
2112 See Klemka v. SAS ISA-Daisytek, Judgment of 26 mai 2003, 8th Ch., trib. comm. Pontoise (Fr.),
slip op. at 3 [hereinafter Daisytek-Pontoise].
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suppliers, which included a guarantee of the outstanding balances owing to suppliers
from Daisytek-France and PAR.
Immediately upon filing the sixteen petitions for administration, Daisytek
obtained administration orders from the chancery division of the Leeds High Court
for fourteen of the sixteen proceedings. The administration orders covered the ten
English companies, the three German companies, and the French company.
21 3
An administration order under the insolvency law of England and Wales2 14 may
only be issued if the debtor is insolvent.2 15  For the German companies and the
French company, the Leeds High Court found that they were either already insolvent
or likely to become so within a short time: The increased pressure from creditors
and the declining levels of inventory made it likely thit soon they would not be able
to pay their respective liabilities as they came due.216
1. Jurisdiction to Open Main Proceedings for the Foreign Companies
The only factor that gave the Leeds court pause in issuing administration orders
for the foreign corporations (the three German companies and the French company)
was the issue of whether the CoMI of each of these companies was in England or
Wales, so that the court would have jurisdiction under the EU Regulation to open
main proceedings for each of them.217
The EU Regulation contemplates that, ordinarily, the first proceeding to be
opened will be a main proceeding. 21 8  A court has jurisdiction to open a main
proceeding only if the court is located in the territory2 19 where the center of the
debtor's main interests is located. 220  The ten English companies enjoyed a
presumption that, absent proof to the contrary, the center of their main interests was
the location of their registered offices.22' Thus, an English court presumptively had
jurisdiction to open a main insolvency proceeding for each of them. However, this
presumption had to be overcome for an English court to have jurisdiction to open
main proceedings for the French and German companies.222
213 On request of counsel for the debtors (for undisclosed reasons), the High Court deferred its
decisions on orders of administration for Hundleby Computer Supplies Ltd., a Scottish company, and
Source Supplies Ltd., a Northern Ireland company.
214 The insolvency law of the United Kingdom is not unified. There is one insolvency law for
England and Wales. Scotland and Northern Ireland each have separate insolvency laws, enacted by the
U.K. Parliament, which differ in some respects from the law for England and Wales. However, the
English law, not the Scottish law, governs corporate insolvencies in Scotland. See, e.g., Margaret R. Cole
et al., The Insolvency Lavs of the United Kingdom, in 2 INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY, U.K. 5 (Carl
Felsenfeld et al., eds. 2003).
215 See Insolvency Act 1986 c 45, pt. 11, s 8(l)(a) (Eng.).216 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 2.
217 See id.
218 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3. 1.
219 One of the reasons that the EU Regulation uses the term "territory" in place of the term "state"
(which, in international terminology means "nation") is that the insolvency law of the United Kingdom is
not unified, so that England and Wales are the relevant territories where a corporation's registered office
must be located to take advantage of the presumption of the location of the center of main interests. See
Daisytek-Pontoise, supra note 212, slip op. at 3.220 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3. 1.
221 See id.
222 Because of the request to reserve decision on granting administration orders for the Scottish and
the Northern Ireland companies, the Leeds court did not address the location of the center of main
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2. Determination of CoM
The only substantive provision in the EU Regulation for the determination of the
location of the CoMI of a company is the presumption in Article 3.1 that it is located
at the place of the company's registered office. Recital 13 in the Preamble, however,
states that "[t]he 'centre of main interests' should 223 correspond to the place where
the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is
therefore ascertainable by third parties. 224
In deciding the location of the CoMI of the German and French companies, the
Leeds court determined that the court must "consider both the scale of the interests
administered at a particular place and their importance and then consider the scale
and importance of its interests administered at any other place which may be
regarded as its center of main interests .... ,225 In addition, the court found it very
important that the center of a debtor's main interests be "ascertainable by third
parties. 226 The court further cited the rationale for the rule, as stated in the Virg6s
and Schmit Report:
Insolvency is a foreseeable risk. It is therefore important that international
jurisdiction (which ... entails the application of the insolvency laws of
that Contracting State) be based on a place known to the debtor's potential
creditors. This enables the legal risks which would have to be assumed in
the case of the insolvency to be calculated.227
The most important third parties, in the view of the Leeds court, are the potential
creditors.228 For a trading company, these creditors are likely to be its financiers and
its trade suppliers.229
The Leeds court found that a large majority of creditors of the German
companies, measured by the amount owing to them 230 (which the court considered
the relevant criterion), knew that the important functions of the German companies
were carried out in Radford, England, and that the scale of these functions was very
significant. 23' In contrast, the court found that the local functions of the German
companies in Germany were limited.232 Only 30% of the trade purchases, the court
interests for these entities. As to the EU Regulation, the center of main interests for each was located in
the United Kingdom. Whether England was the proper venue for these companies was an issue under
internal U.K. law.
223 The official text of the regulation says "should" at this point. However, the Leeds court in its
decision quotes the provision as saying "shall."
224 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, pmbl. 13. The Leeds court applied this statement as if it was
an operative part of the EU Regulation. See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 2.
225 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 3; accord In re Aim Underwriting Agencies (Ireland)
Ltd., [2004] EWCH 2114, 2004 WL 2246316 (Jr.); see also MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 8.39 ("The
focus is more on the location of the place where head office functions are carried out than on the location
of the head office.").226 See id. (citing Geveran Trading Co. v. Skjevesland, 2002 WL 31947334 (Eng.)).
227 Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 75.
228 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 3.
229 See id.
230 It is not clear that the amount owing is the proper measure of creditor interest. Under this
approach, a single large bank debt may prevail over a large number of supplier creditors, for the
determination of the CoMI. For a critique of this approach, see Raimon, supra note 55, at 750.
231 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 3.
232 See id at *4.
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found, were negotiated in Germany. 233 While eighty-five percent of the customers
were in Germany, the court gave this less weight because customers are typically
debtors of the businesses rather than creditors. 3
The Leeds court found that the three German companies all had their registered
offices in Neuss, Germany, and that they conducted their businesses from premises
in Freilassing, Magdeburg and Mulheim. Thus, their CoMI was not at the location
of their registered offices. Although their business headquarters, for the purposes of
conducting business in Germany, assuredly were located in Germany and they each
had German bank accounts, the Leeds court found that these factors were not
dispositive.
The Leeds court found that eight factors tied the management of each of the
German companies to England.2 35 First, the business of each of these subsidiaries
was funded by German subsidiaries of the Royal Bank of Scotland and through a
factoring agreement with an English subsidiary of the bank, and their financial
information was compiled in accordance with English accounting principles and
reviewed and approved by International in Bradford. Second, any purchase
exceeding E5000 required International's approval in Bradford. Third, all senior
employees of the German subsidiaries were recruited in consultation with
International. Fourth, all information technology and support were managed in
Bradford. Fifth, all European-wide customers of the German subsidiaries, which
accounted for fifteen percent of their sales, were negotiated and serviced by
International. Sixth, International negotiated all of the contracts with the major
suppliers for the German subsidiaries, and seventy percent of the purchases were
under contracts negotiated and dealt with from Bradford. Seventh, all corporate
identity and branding were administered by International. Finally, the chief
executive officer of Daisytek-ISA drew up the management strategy for the German
subsidiaries, visited those subsidiaries two days per month, and spent thirty percent
of his time on their management. The Leeds court found this evidence sufficient to
rebut the presumption that the CoMIs of the German subsidiaries were located in
Germany.236
As to Daisytek-France, the Leeds court found that the evidence was essentially
the same as for the German subsidiaries.2 37 The court found two differences. First,
International provided financial support for the French company, while the German
companies had their own financing.238 Second, the chief executive of International
spent forty percent of his time (mostly in Bradford) administering the French




235 See id. at *3.
236 See id. at *3-4. Cf. In re Aim Underwriting Agencies (Ireland) Ltd., No. 4181/2004, 2004 WL
2246316, at *2-5 (Ch., July 2, 2004) (Ir.) (finding that center of main interests of Irish company was
located in United Kingdom).
237 See Daisylek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, T 4. The essential identity of the information for the
French company and the German companies alone is sufficient to cast suspicion on the sufficiency of the
evidence before the court in Leeds on the location of the center of main interests of these foreign
companies.
238 See id at *4.
239 See id.
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Consequently, the Leeds court found that Daisytek-France's CoMI was also located
in Bradford, England.
No party in interest took an appeal of this decision by the High Court in Leeds.
The outcome could have been quite different if an appeal had been taken. 4 °
C. The French Proceeding'
The management of Daisytek-France, the French subsidiary, declared a
cessation of payments and filed a voluntary insolvency proceeding in the commercial
court in Pontoise, France on May 23, 2003.241 The French directors required the
French management to file the proceeding242 because they faced sanctions, as well as
criminal liability, if the corporation continued to conduct business for more than
fifteen days after its cessation of payments.
24
I. Decision of French Commercial Court in Pontoise
At a hearing on May 26, 2003, the Pontoise Commercial Court took up the issue
of the opening of a main insolvency case for Daisytek-France under French law.2"
At the hearing, the court had both a certified copy of the May 16 decision of the
Leeds court and an authenticated translation into French. Nonetheless, the Pontoise
court issued an order opening a main proceeding for Daisytek-France,2 45 and
246 247appointed a French administrator246 and a creditors' representative.
The three English administrators for Daisytek-France promptly brought third-
party proceedings in the Pontoise court to contest the opening of a main proceeding
for Daisytek-France, and on July 1, 2003, the court dismissed their proceedings. In
its July 1 decision, the Pontoise court noted that the English proceedings were
opened before its May 26 decision to open its own proceedings for Daisytek-
France.248 However, the court found that the Leeds proceedings for Daisytek-France
were not opened in compliance with the EU Regulation on two grounds.
240 See infra discussion accompanying notes 342-45.
241 French insolvency law (contained in the Code de Commerce) mandates that a debtor file its
proceeding within fifteen days after its cessation of payments. See C. COM. art. L. 621-1. "Cessation of
payments," under the French law, arises for an enterprise when it is "impossible to pay current liabilities
with its liquid assets." See id.
242 Given the English bankruptcy filing for Daisytek-France, one could question the authority of the
French directors and management to act on its behalf. However, this issue was not litigated, either in
France or in England.
23 A director of a French corporation (of any type provided by French law) who fails to cause the
filing of an insolvency case for the corporation within fifteen days of the corporation's cessation of
payments risks criminal liability for "using ruinous methods" to obtain funds to avoid or delay the
commencement of insolvency proceedings for the corporation. See C. com. art. L. 626-2(1). In addition,
such a director risks personal bankruptcy. See id. art. L. 625-5 (5). Alternatively, the court may impose a
variety of other civil disabilities for a minimum of five years. See id. arts. L. 625-8-625-10.
244 The scheduling of this hearing only three days after the filing of the case (which included an
intervening weekend) was remarkably swift under French practice. Normally, it takes at least ten to
fourteen days to open a voluntary insolvency case in France.245 See Klempka v. ISA Daisytek SAS, 2003 WL 22936778, [20041 1.L.Pr.6 (C d' A 2003) (Fr.), I I
[hereinafter Daisytek- Versailles].246 See C. COM. art. L 621-8.
247 See id.
248 See Daisytek- Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 3.
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First, the court found that the filing of a proper insolvency proceeding for
Daisytek-ISA did not give the English court jurisdiction to open a proceeding for its
French subsidiary: the EU Regulation has no provision for corporate groups, and
each company in such a group has a separate legal personality and must be treated
independently. 249 The Leeds decision, in its view, was tantamount to the denial of
the separate legal identity of Daisytek-France. 25 0 Second, the Pontoise court found
that the location of an establishment in England did not support English jurisdiction
to open a main proceeding for two reasons: (1) an establishment is not a separate
legal personality and (2) under the EU Regulation, an establishment only gives rise
to jurisdiction to open a secondary proceeding, not a main proceeding.25'
The Pontoise Commercial Court apparently gave no consideration to the fact
that Daisytek-France had filed its own voluntary bankruptcy proceeding in Leeds,
and that the Leeds court judge had made a separate finding that its CoMI was located
in Bradford, England.252 Perhaps the court missed this point because the judge of the
commercial court in Pontoise was not a lawyer.
253
The English administrators took an appeal of the Court of Appeal in Versailles.
Shortly after the appeal was taken, on July 16, 2003, the Pontoise court approved a
rescue plan for Daisytek-France pursuant to which the business was sold to a third
party.
254
2. Versailles Court of Appeal Decision
The Versailles Court of Appeal reversed the commercial court's opening of a
main proceeding for Daisytek-France in its decision issued September 4, 2003.
a. Court's Analysis of EU Regulation's Jurisdictional Provisions
Analyzing EU Regulation Article 3, the Versailles court found that this
provision establishes four principles. 255 First, the court having jurisdiction to open
the main insolvency proceeding must be located within the territory where the CoMl
is located. Second, no court in another territory has such jurisdiction. Third, for a
company, the CoMI is presumed to be where the registered office is located. Fourth,
where the company's CoMI is not located in the country where the registered office
is located, the only court with jurisdiction to open an insolvency proceeding is that




252 See Daisytek-Pontoise, supra note 212, slip op. at 3-4.
253 It is typical for judges in commercial courts in France to lack law degrees. A commercial court
judge is typically a business person provided by the local chamber of commerce. The purpose of this
practice is to give practical business solutions to commercial law problems, rather than sophisticated legal
analysis. See Richard L. Koral & Marie-Christine Sordino, The New Bankruptcy Reorganization Law in
France: Ten Years Later, 70 AM BANKR. L.J. 437, 443 (1996).
254 See Daniel Valdman, ISA Daisytek Synthesis (handwritten notes on file with author). The
Commercial Court in Pointoise appointed Mr. Valdman as administrator in the Daisytek-France case.
The Versailles Court of Appeals does not mention the July 16, 2003 plan confirmation in its September,
2003 decision.
255 See Daisytek-Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 14.
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circumstance, a court in the territory where the registered office is located lacks
jurisdiction to open an insolvency proceeding. In summary, the sole criterion for
establishing jurisdiction to open a main insolvency proceeding is the location of the
company's CoMI.
25 6
The Versailles court stated that the Pontoise court was correct in two of its
rulings. First, the Pontoise court correctly decided that the location of an
establishment is irrelevant to the determination of the CoMI's location.257 Second, it
correctly found that the concept of a group of companies is equally irrelevant to this
jurisdictional issue.258
b. Versailles Court's Analysis of English Court's Finding on CoMI
The Versailles court next turned to an analysis of how the Leeds court arrived at
its decision that the CoMI for Daisytek-France was located in Bradford, England.
The Leeds High Court, the Versailles court noted, gave specific consideration to the
issue of its jurisdiction, and correctly noted that such jurisdiction must be predicated
upon the location of the CoMI of the foreign corporations in England or Wales.259
The Versailles court also noted that the Leeds court had determined that, in order to
overcome the presumption that the CoMI was located at the registered office, the
debtor had to show that its CoMI was located in England.260 Further, the Leeds court
listed the significant acts for the German and French companies that had taken place
in Bradford, and concluded that these facts effectively made Bradford their CoMI. 26I
The Versailles court concluded that the Leeds court properly determined its
jurisdiction based on the location of Daisytek-France's CoMI, and did not base this
decision on either the location of an establishment for its business or on the concept
of a group of companies. 62 Notably, the Versailles court did not analyze whether
the Leeds court decided this issue correctly. The court only examined whether the
Leeds court considered the proper issues. 263
In consequence, the Versailles Court of Appeal found, EU Regulation Article 16
mandates that a judgment, by a court of an EU member with jurisdiction, opening
insolvency proceedings must be recognized in all other EU Member States. 264 The
court held that, because the Leeds court applied the correct legal standard in
determining where Daisytek-France's CoMI was located, and found that the facts
supporting its jurisdiction were adequately demonstrated, the EU Regulation
required that the Leeds court judgment opening a main insolvency proceeding for
Daisytek-France be recognized in France.265
2 See id.
257 See id. 4-5.
258 See id. 5.




263 Even the limited review of the Leeds decision was arguably too extensive. Under the EU
Regulation, a court in a second country should only consider whether the first court had jurisdiction. See
EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 3.
264 See Daisytek- Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 6.
265 See id. For a critique of this decision, see Raimon, supra note 55, at 754-58.
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d. Procedural Issues
Finally, the Versailles court turned to several procedural issues raised by the
French Daisytek-France administrator. Two of these objections are important for
this Article. First, the administrator argued that the English administration order was
not published in the Commercial Register.26 Second, he contended that the English
administrator had not convened a meeting of the Daisytek-France works council, as
required by French law.
267
The court recognized the French law requirement of publication in the
Commercial Register of a decision opening an insolvency proceeding.2 68 However,
the court found that the lack of publication had no consequence for the effect of the
English court decision which, under the EU Regulation,269 prevented a French court
from opening a main proceeding.2 70  The Versailles court further found that EU
Regulation Article 17 requires that, with no further formalities, the English
administration order produce the same effects in France (or any other EU member
state) as it does in England. 7'
As to the French law obligation to convene a meeting of the works council
representatives, the court made two responses. First, it noted that the administrators
in the English proceeding had no capacity to convene such a meeting. 72 Second, the
court opined that the failure to call such a meeting could only be challenged by
taking an appeal from the decision opening the main proceeding in Leeds, which the
French administrator had failed to do. 73
In consequence, the Versailles court found that the Leeds court had validly
opened a main proceeding for Daisytek-France, and that, pursuant to the provisions
of the EU Regulation, no French court had jurisdiction to open a subsequent main
proceeding for the company.274 Thus, the decision of the Pontoise Commercial
Court to open a main insolvency proceeding for Daisytek-France violated the EU
Regulation.275
There is another procedural issue (with substantial substantive consequences)
that the Versailles court did not address. While the appeal was pending, on July 16,
2003 the Pontoise court confirmed the reorganization of Daisytek-France by
authorizing a split into two parts and confirming the sale of the direct sales business
to one purchaser and the sale of the indirect sales business to a second purchaser.
The administrator appointed in Leeds (PricewaterhouseCoopers) demanded a
266 See Decree No. 85-1388, December 27, 1985, J.O., Dec. 29, 1985, p. 15281 art. 21 (as amended),
(requiring publication in the Commercial Register of an order opening an insolvency case) (abrogated by
Decree No. 2005-1677, Dec. 28, 2005, J.O., Dec. 29, 2005, p. 20324 art. 354).
267 See C. COM. art. L. 621-4 (requiring the court to summon representatives of the works council (or
delegates of the work force if there is no works council) before ordering the opening of an insolvency
proceeding).
'6' See Daisytek- Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 6.
269 See EU Regulation, supra note 9 art. 17.
270 See Daisytek-Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 6. The English proceeding administrators argued
that in fact they had asked the Pontoise Commercial Court to publish the English administration order,
and the court office refused to make the publication. See id.
271 See id.
272 See id. 6-7.
273 See id.
274 See id. 7.275 See id. 6.
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turnover of the proceeds. 276 The French judicial administrator had to negotiate a
solution to the issues arising out of the sales, including his compensation and the
compensation of his professionals. 77
E. The German Proceedings
On May 19, 2003, the German business manager of the German subsidiaries
filed an application in the county court in DUsseldorf to open main bankruptcy
proceedings for the three German Daisytek companies: PAR, Supplies Team, and
Daisytek-Germany. On the same day, the DUsseldorf court appointed a preliminary
insolvency administrator for Supplies Team and Daisytek-Germany.27 The only
grounds stated for opening the insolvency proceedings was "overindebtedness.
'279
The manager of the German subsidiaries failed to inform the court that main
proceedings had been opened for each of these entities the previous week in
England.280  The newly appointed administrator brought the Leeds filings to the
attention of the German court on June 4 and, two days later, the court issued an order
that the Leeds decision would have no binding effect on the Dusseldorf court
because the Leeds court did not either mention or follow the EU Regulation.2 1 On
June 12, the English insolvency administrators moved the DUsseldorf court to enter
the Leeds judgment (including a German translation) in the court records, which the
German court denied on June 23 on the same grounds as the June 6 order.282
On July 9, the preliminary insolvency administrator moved the DUsseldorf court
to open insolvency proceedings for the Supplies Team and Daisytek-Germany
proceedings. The court granted the motions the next day and appointed the
temporary administrator as the insolvency administrator in both proceedings.283
Having failed the first time to obtain recognition of the Leeds order opening
main insolvency proceedings for the German subsidiaries, the English insolvency
administrator, on July 23, filed an extraordinary complaint against the opening order
on the grounds that it violated EU Regulation Article 3, and promised further
grounds for court action.284 By decision of July 29, the Dtisseldorf court refused to
take action on this complaint, on the grounds that the Leeds decision was null and
276 See Valdman, supra note 254.
277 See id.
278 See Judgment of Mar. 3, 2004, AG Duisseldorf, 501 IN 126/03, slip op. at I (Ger.). [hereinafter
DusseldorA
279 See id. Under the German insolvency law, overindebtedness is one of the grounds for filing a
voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. insO § 16, available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/lnsO.pdf
("The opening of insolvency proceedings shall require the existence of a reason to open such
proceedings."); § 19 ("Overindebtedness shall also be a reason [in addition to illiquidity or imminent
illiquidity] to open insolvency proceedings for a corporation ... Overindebtedness shall exist if the assets
owned by the debtor no longer cover its existing obligations to pay.").
28
0 See Dusseldorf, 501 IN 126/03, slip op. at 1.
281 See id. Apparently, as of June 6, 2003, the Dusseldorf court did not have a copy of the published
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void as to Supplies Team. 285 The English administrator filed his "further grounds"
on August 21, which included statements of the English solicitor, who was counsel
to Supplies Team, and the Leeds court judgment.28 6
The Dtsseldorf county court then referred the extraordinary complaint to the
District Court, which, on October 23, reversed the county court's July 29 order
denying relief to the English administrator, and remanded the matter for further
proceedings.287 Because of a transition in the county court, the remand went to a
new judge, who for the first time on January 12, 2004, ordered a full briefing by the
parties in interest.288 On March 8, 2004 the debtor filed a motion to open a
secondary proceeding under the EU Regulation.289
On March 12, the DUsseldorf court withdrew the prior order opening a main
proceeding and granted the motion to open a secondary proceeding.290 The court
found that the prior judge's refusal to recognize the judgment of the Leeds court
opening a main proceeding was invalid, and that the court's subsequent refusals to
alter this position were incorrect. 291 The earlier opening of a main proceeding in
Leeds had to be respected pursuant to EU Regulation Article 16, the court found.292
The prior judge was misled, the court found, by the local manager, who failed to
inform the court that she knew of the Leeds decision opening a main proceeding for
Supply Team, and her giving the court the impression that the Leeds decision was
made without her knowledge in violation of due process. The manager had
subsequently admitted that she had consented to the Leeds filing.293
The proceedings for PAR were simpler. On August 1, 2003, the Dusseldorf
court opened a secondary proceeding for PAR, after recognizing the pending main
case in Leeds.294
V. EU REGULATION-NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS
It is clear that there were major deficiencies in the procedures in the handling of
several of the Daisytek and Eurofood proceedings. There are also major
shortcomings in the substantive law under the EU Regulation. I first address the
substantive issues.
A. Substantive Improvements
The Daisytek and Eurofood cases bring to light two kinds of substantive
improvements that the EU Regulation needs. First, the Regulation needs revision to
285 The Dusseldorf county court based this decision on a legal opinion of Professor Dr. Christoph
Parulos of July 3, 2003, which the temporary administrator filed with the July 9 request to open an
insolvency proceeding for Supplies Team.2






291 See id. at 2.
292 See id.
293 See id.
294 Email from Hon. Andreas Lemmert, Judge of Court of Appeals Cologne/Oberlandesgericht Koln
(Ger.) (Feb. 25, 2004) (on file with author).
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take account of corporate groups in venue decision-making. Second, the Regulation
needs a better definition of CoMI to specify whether a particular factor should
predominate in the CoMI determination, or whether a court should evaluate all of the
relevant factors.
1. Corporate Groups
The first important change needed in the substantive law underlying the EU
Regulation is to provide for the filing in the same venue of all insolvency
proceedings for the members of a corporate group that constitute an integrated
economic unit.
Virtually all multinational corporate empires are corporate groups, not single
corporations. Indeed, there are often hundreds of legally separate entities,295 and
they may be doing business in scores of countries.296 Some of them operate
independent businesses. Others are integral parts of a larger business operation.
Still others fall in between.297
The EU Regulation does not address the problem of corporate groups. It
assumes that each legal entity should be evaluated separately to determine where its
CoMI is located, which is the proper venue for its main insolvency proceeding.
298
More specifically, the EU Regulation does not authorize the filing or opening of a
main proceeding for a particular company in a specific country because a parent
company or other affiliate has opened a main proceeding in that country.299 The EU
Regulation makes no provision for any degree of cooperation between proceedings
for related entities, 3°° and it makes no provision for substantive consolidation.30'
This approach is unsatisfactory because a corporate group that is an integrated
economic unit can only be reorganized or liquidated efficiently 30 2  if the
reorganization is done collectively for the entire group.
30 3
295 The Mercedes Benz-Chrysler corporate empire, for example, includes nearly a thousand separate
legal entities. Consolidated Financial Statements of DaimlerChrysler AG at December 21, 2004,
Statement of Investments in affiliated, associated and related Companies according to §313 HGB
(German Commercial Code), available at http://www.daimlerchrysler.com/Projects/c2c/channel/
documents/628144_SubsidiaryListGroup 2004_e.pdf.
296 Parmalat involved more than a hundred affiliated entities doing business in thirty countries.
When BCCI Holdings collapsed, it was doing business in some seventy-two countries.
297 For a similar proposal, although somewhat different in its details, see Robert van Galen, The
European Insolvency Regulation and Groups of Companies (2004), available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/
country/europeanunion/Cork_paper.pdf.
298 See, e.g., id. (proposing revisions to the EU Regulation to provide for joint bankruptcy
proceedings for corporate groups); Eurofood A.G. Report, supra note 28, 117 ("[Elach subsidiary in a
group must be considered individually."); Wessels, supra note 26, at 178-80 (stating that the EU
Regulation provides no rule for groups of affiliated companies); Virg6s & Schmit, supra note 28, 76
(making the same point as Wessels, supra).
299 It appears that the European Regulation authorizes a liquidator in a main proceeding to open a
secondary proceeding for a related entity in the same country, notwithstanding that the related entity's
CoMI is located elsewhere. See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 29, pmbl. (19).
300 See, e.g., MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 1 8.56
301 See supra note 198; MOSS ET AL., supra note 2 1, 8.56.
302 It is common wisdom, which is true in many cases, that a business is much more valuable as an
integrated whole that is sold as an operating business than its parts are worth separately. For example, the
English forklift manufacturer Lancer Boss would have realized considerably greater value if it had been
sold as a single business with its German subsidiary instead of undergoing separate liquidations. This is
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Both the Leeds High Court and the Versailles Court of Appeal noted that this
factor could not be considered in determining the location of the CoMI of Daisytek-
France. The Italian court of appeals, on the other hand, disregarded the lack of
corporate group provisions in the EU Regulation and applied Italian corporate group
law to justify the opening of an Italian Eurofood main proceeding in the court where
the Parmalat case was pending.3 4
The sensible solution is to administer economically integrated group members in
the home country of the integrated group, and to administer economically
independent group members separately in their respective home countries. A sketch
follows on how such a rule could operate.
a. Proposed Modification to CoMI Definition
The CoMI definition should be modified to provide that the venue decision for a
corporate group under EU Regulation Article 3 be based on the collective CoMI of
all of the legal entities that operate together as an integrated economic unit. Thus,
where two or more companies are economically integrated and operate as a single
economic group, the CoMI decision for the corporate group would displace a
decision based on the CoMI of separate legal entities. In contrast, where a company
that is part of a corporate group is not integrated with the others into a single
economic unit, the court should decide its proper venue separately, based on the
location of its own CoMI (as the EU Regulation and Model Law now provide).
A corporate entity in a group of related entities should be recognized as
economically integrated into the group, for international venue purposes, if it
depends on business derived from other members of the group for its economic
survival and livelihood. A typical corporate group has a number of entities (perhaps
hundreds) that depend on other members of the group for corporate survival, and this
relationship is often reciprocal. They often resemble parts of a machine that have no
reason for existing apart from the entity of which they form a part.
On the other hand, corporate groups often have entities (again, perhaps
hundreds) that can survive independently from the group itself, and do not depend on
the group for their existence and livelihood. An individual corporate entity that has
sufficient economic independence to stand on its own, without the business activities
of the rest of the corporate group, would not be economically integrated into the
known as the "going concern" bonus in reorganization cases. If a business is not worth more as a going
concern, it should be liquidated.
303 If the subsidiary is not economically integrated into the corporate group and can stand on its own,
it can be reorganized separately. Such separate reorganization has been accomplished or is in process for
several of the Parmalat subsidiaries. See, e.g., Senator Charles E. Schumer, New York, Parmalat
Decision to Not Sell U.S. Assets Both Preserves Competition for Farmers and Helps Prevent Milk Price
Hikes, May 18, 2004, available at http://schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press-releases/
2004/PR02637.Parm05t804.html (announcing the restructuring of Parmalat's U.S. operations); Felsberg e
Associados, Parmalat Files the First Request for Judicial Restructing in Sdo Paulo, July 12, 2005,
available at http://www.felsberg.com.br/ingles/felsbergnews-contents.asp?i = 16463&desc=if (describing
the separate reorganization of Parmalat's Brazilian subsidiary in Sao Paolo, Brazil).
304 See Eurofood-Italy, supra note 63, slip op. at 25 (holding that parent corporation in extraordinary
administration has the right to request extraordinary administration proceedings for its subsidiaries based
on "the need to allow, according to the logic of intra-company group dealings, uniform management of
the business belonging to the group").
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group. Such an entity could have its own independent insolvency proceeding (which
could be in another country).
A typical corporate empire has corporate entities of both kinds, some whose
livelihoods are inextricably tied to the other members of the group, and others that
are perfectly capable of standing alone, though they may make important
contributions to the corporate group.
Some members of a corporate group may not fit neatly into either of these two
categories. I recommend a default rule providing that, unless a member of a
corporate group can function economically on its own, it is considered a dependent
member of the group, and is entitled to file its insolvency proceeding in the same
country (and presumably the same court) as the parent or master corporation.
Where an economically integrated member of a corporate group is a foreign
corporation (that is, it is incorporated in a country separate from that where the
parent corporation files its insolvency proceeding), the corporate law applicable to it
may impose obligations that do not exist in the country where the parent's
insolvency proceeding is filed. For example, the Daisytek-France union
representatives (or other worker representatives if the employees were not
unionized) had a right to be heard under French insolvency law before the opening
of an insolvency proceeding.0 5 In my view, such a company should be required to
comply with the applicable business laws of its country of incorporation in
connection with filing its insolvency proceeding abroad. Thus, the court should have
been required to hear the worker representatives under applicable French law before
opening an insolvency proceeding for Daisytek-France in England.
Admittedly, making a CoMI decision for a corporate group or economic unit
will be more difficult than making such a decision for an individual legal entity. It
will be necessary first to define which legal entities form a part of the integrated
economic unit for which the CoMI decision is to be made. In contrast, if the
decision is made separately for each legal entity, there is no issue of identifying the
entity in question. Courts will need judges with suitable training to make such
decisions, which may lead to the wider adoption of specialized bankruptcy courts or
the assignment of bankruptcy proceedings to specialized commercial courts with
appropriately trained judges. 3°6
My proposed rule would also not provide an easy solution for a company that is
only partially integrated into the corporate group, and may or may not be able to
operate separately. This decision would turn on the facts of the particular case,
which may call for a difficult judgment by the trial judge. As the Eurofood and
Daisytek proceedings illustrate, this kind of decision will not likely arise often as to
entities of substantial importance. However, it is the job of a judge to make difficult
305 See C. COM. art. L 621-4.
30 Some countries already have specialized bankruptcy courts. These countries include the United
States, Thailand, and Slovakia. In other countries, such as Morocco, bankruptcy cases go to commercial
courts that handle other commercial cases, but not non-business cases. At the other end of the spectrum
are countries such as Germany, where bankruptcy cases go to county courts (which are essentially small
claims courts staffed with very junior judges). In France, where most bankruptcy cases go to the
Commerce Tribunal, commercial cases are staffed with judges elected by the chamber of commerce, who
usually have no legal training. See Koral & Sordino, supra note 253, at 443; Jean-Michel Lucheux, Draft
Bill on Reorganization, Projet de Loi de Sauvegarde des Enterprise, available at http://www.iiiglobal.org/
country/france/DraftBillFrance.pdf.
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decisions, and this is no different in kind from many others that judges are routinely
required to make. Furthermore, creditors ex ante will know that they are dealing
with such a company in most cases and will price their credit accordingly.
It is much harder to manipulate the CoMI of a corporate group than it is to
manipulate the CoMI of a particular corporation. °7 This is especially true for a large
corporate group such as Parmalat. Moving the CoMI of a corporate group such as
General Motors, IBM, or General Electric out of the United States, or the CoMI of
Fiat out of Italy, would be a formidable task. Furthermore, the possibility of filing
secondary proceedings in those countries that have an establishment ameliorates
very substantially the procedural difficulties of a foreign main proceeding. Thus, use
of the CoMI of the corporate group for bankruptcy venue purposes promotes ex ante
predictability and reduces transaction costs.
b. U.S. Experience with Corporate Groups in Bankruptcy
The U.S. experience is that it is usually best for the insolvency proceedings for
related companies to be administered in the same court. For this reason, U.S. law
has a rather broad provision for the filing of bankruptcy proceedings by related
entities in the same court. The statute provides in relevant part: "[A bankruptcy
case] may be commenced in the district court for the district- .. .(2) in which there
is pending a case under title 11 concerning such person's affiliate, general partner, or
partnership.
308
Generally, any corporation that holds a twenty percent interest in a debtor may
file its own bankruptcy case in the same court as the debtor.3 0 9 Equally, any
company in which the debtor holds a twenty percent interest may also file in the
same court?. 0  If two cases with the specified relationship are filed in separate
courts, the court in which the first case was filed determines where the cases should
proceed, and whether in the same district or in separate districts. 31' The court makes
this determination based on "the interest of justice or the convenience of the
parties. 31 2 Pursuant to this provision, a group of related companies almost always
file their bankruptcy cases in the same court in the United States.
There is no comparable provision in the EU Regulation. Under the EU
Regulation, each company must justify the country where its main bankruptcy
proceeding is to be opened by showing that the CoMI of that particular legal entity is
located in that country.3t 3 The EU Regulation should be amended to include a
provision like that in the U.S. law on the venue of related corporate entities.
My recommendation for the EU Regulation (which I also make with respect to
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies) 314 is substantially
narrower than the U.S. practice: I would authorize the filing of affiliate proceedings
307 See Guzman, supra note 27, at 2214.
308 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2005).
309 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A) (2005).
310 See id. § 101(2XB).
.. See U.S.C.S. § 1014(b) (Fed. R. of Bankr. P. 2005).
312 See id.
s3 See WESSELS, supra note 2 1, at 9-11.
314 See BUFFORD ET AL., supra note 10, at 135-38.
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in the same court as the master proceeding only for economically integrated
affiliates, rather than for all affiliates.
There is an important reason for taking a narrower approach. The choice of
venue largely determines the substantive and procedural rules applicable to an
insolvency proceeding: For the most part, domestic law and procedural rules
govern.3t 5 The choice of venue among domestic courts in a particular country is
much less important than the choice of venue between countries: Within a particular
country, there is usually a single applicable insolvency law and procedures, and a
single or closely comparable applicable non-insolvency regime.31 6 In contrast, the
variations in insolvency laws among countries are vastly greater, and implicate
national policies to a far greater extent. The narrow scope of venue that I
recommend for related entities gives recognition to the importance of differing
national policies expressed in their insolvency laws: There will be fewer
proceedings under my approach where a particular corporation's proceeding will not
be filed in the country where its own CoMI is located.317
c. Impact of My Recommendation on Daisytek and Eurofood Proceedings
According to my view on corporate groups, both Daisytek-France and the
German Daisytek operating subsidiaries should not have had main proceedings in
England because, apparently, they were essentially stand-alone operations (except
for the activities of one manager in England). In contrast, under my approach the
Eurofood proceeding most certainly would be properly venued in Italy, and not in
Ireland.
2. Definition of CoMI
There are three different perspectives on the CoMI of a particular corporation
that are recognized in the reported cases. It appears that the EU Regulation
contemplates that these different perspectives will all be considered by the court
making the determination of the CoMI of a corporation in a particular case.
However, the courts have tended to give priority to one perspective over the others in
their decisions.
One perspective on a corporation's CoMI is to focus on the corporation's "nerve
center," or the location where executive decisions are made.318 In Eurofood-Parma,
for example, the trial court found that the effective headquarters of the company,
consisting in management activity and the main directive center of the company,
were situated at the parent's headquarters in Parma, Italy. 319 The "real management"
315 See supra text accompanying notes 35-44.
316 One exception to this generalization is the United Kingdom. See supra note 214. Even in the
United Kingdom, the separate laws in Scotland and Northern Ireland are very similar, and the scale of
their differences is very small compared with differences among the insolvency laws of various countries.
317 The location of the CoMI is the basis for international venue for main insolvency proceedings.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
3' Cf MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 8.39 ("[T]he focus is more correctly the question of the
location of the place where head office functions are carried out than on the location of the head office.").
319 See Eurofood-Parma, supra note 108, slip op. at 3-4. Circulaire Relative A I'Entre en Vigueur du
Riglement n' 1346/2000 du 29 Mai 2000 Relatif aux Procddures d'insolvabilit6, Bulletin Officiel du
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of the business, the court found, was carried out by the Italian employees of the
Parmalat Group in Parma.320 This "de facto situation," the court held, should prevail
over the formal incorporation of the business in Ireland.32 1 In addition, the Parma
court found, the two large transactions that the corporation undertook were managed
by the Parmalat executives in Parma.
A variation on this perspective appears in the Daisytek-Leeds decision, which
focused on the scale of interests administered in a particular country and their
322importance to the corporation. Another variation on this view appears in the
Eurofood-Italy decision, which found decisive the control relationship with the
parent corporation, which was in extraordinary administration in Italy.323
A second perspective is to focus on the actual operations and conduct of the
business, and to inquire where this takes place. This kind of inquiry may not lead to
a clear choice of one country, particularly where the business operations are
extensive in more than one country. This perspective is illustrated in the Eurofood-
Dublin case, where the court explored in substantial detail the location of the
corporation's business offices, the location of the corporation's board members and
their meetings, and the source of limitations on its corporate charter (based on Irish
law). This kind of inquiry may not lead to a clear choice of one country, particularly
where the business operations are extensive in more than one country.
A third perspective is to examine the expectations of the creditors of the debtor,
such as the suppliers and the financiers.324 In Daisytek-Leeds, the court found that
the financing for the French and German subsidiaries was all arranged in England,
and that seventy percent of the goods supplied to the French and German
subsidiaries were supplied under contracts arranged by the headquarters office in
England.325
In my view, a court should treat each of these perspectives as factors for
consideration in determining the CoMI in a particular case. None should have
decisive importance. At the same time, the weight given each factor will vary
depending on the nature of the business and the extent of operations or executive
decision-making involved in the particular case. This requires a particularized
examination of the facts in each case.326
It must be admitted that, in the final analysis, courts may differ in the evaluation
of these factors and may arrive at different conclusions.327 Article 16 deals with this
Ministtre de Justice Num. 89, (le janvier-31 mars 2003) (noting that a corporation's CoMI is located at
the effective center of the management of its business).
320 See Eurofood-Parma, supra note 108, slip op. at 4.
321 See id. at 4-5.
322 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 1 3.
323 See Eurofood-ltaly, supra note 63, slip op. at 15.
324 The suppliers may have quite different expectations from the financiers with respect to the CoMI
of a corporation. For example, the suppliers of a subsidiary of an intemational corporate empire may be
located entirely in the country where the subsidiary conducts its business, while the financiers may be
located in the country where the corporate empire obtains its financing.32
1 See Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 3-4.
326 See Raimon, supra note 55, at 745-53 (discussing cases).
327 It is doubtful, in my view, that the discrepancy between the Eurofood-Dublin decision and that in
Eurofood-Parma rests substantially on differing views of the proper weight allowable to these factors.
The difference in these decisions appears to rest principally on the difference in evidence presented to
those courts, and the inability of the Irish liquidators to present their evidence to the Parma court before it
made its CoMI decision. See infra text accompanying notes 359-75.
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situation: the first court in time to issue a "judgment opening insolvency
proceedings" has priority, subject only to a requirement that the court have
jurisdiction.328
B. Procedural Improvements
Procedural issues are crucial to the determination of the location of the main
proceeding for a company with international transactions. The result of such a
determination is substantial: It determines which country's laws will, for the most
329part, govern the rights of creditors and other interested parties in the proceeding.
The governing law for most issues in the main proceeding is the law of the country
where the main proceeding is opened.330 The choice of forum governs such rights as
the scope of the automatic stay or moratorium and the rights to be relieved
therefrom, the availability of interim relief pending the opening of an insolvency
proceeding, the rights of workers in the proceeding, the priority of claims, the right
to reorganize, and the voting requirements for approval of a reorganization plan.
Thus, a procedure is needed to guarantee a full and fair consideration of the issues
that determine the location of the CoMI.
The EU Regulation is notably lacking in procedural rules. The strategy of the
EU Regulation is to rely on domestic procedural rules to govern EU Regulation
procedures. Because each of the EU member countries has a domestic bankruptcy
law, this strategy is largely well founded. However, the EU Regulation contains
distinctive substantive and procedural provisions that are not reflected in domestic
bankruptcy procedures, and which need supplementary procedural rules.
Because the procedural rules would specifically apply to rights under the EU
Regulation, it is appropriate that the procedural rules be adopted at the EU level.
Presumably, the EU has the power to issue a supplementary procedural regulation to
establish procedures for the application of the EU Regulation in the national courts
of the member countries.
The application of the EU Regulation to date shows that it needs three important
procedural improvements to make it workable. The first major improvement needed
is the adoption of procedures governing a decision on the location of the debtor's
CoMI, which, in turn, determines the country where a main proceeding should be
located. In particular, this decision must be unlinked from the decision to open an
insolvency proceeding and other "first day" orders, and the procedures need to
provide a fair venue hearing, on notice to all creditors and other interested parties,
and an opportunity to be heard.
The second major improvement is to adopt a definition of the "opening" of a
proceeding, to provide for the procedures under the laws of countries such as Ireland
and the United Kingdom, which do not include a traditional judicial order for
opening a proceeding.
328 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 16.
329 See supra text accompanying notes 34-44.
330 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 4 (stating that the law of the forum state governs an
international insolvency proceeding governed by the EU Regulation, except to the extent that the EU
Regulation provides otherwise).
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The third set of procedural reforms needed fall generally under the category of
"due process." Procedural rights that need recognition include (a) advance notice of
important hearings in a proceeding (including the decision on the CoMI),
(b) providing copies of relevant papers for a hearing, (c) recognizing a right for all
parties in interest (including foreign liquidators) to be heard and to present evidence,
(d) granting a right to appeal, including a right to consideration by the ECJ, and (e)
coordinating procedural rules in the various countries so that no party obtains a
procedural advantage by virtue of filing in a particular country with more efficient
procedural rules.
Under chapter 15, the U.S. domestication of the UNCITRAL Model Law,33' the
procedural situation is more favorable. In addition to the bankruptcy code, the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide a substantial set of procedural rules
promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court (on the recommendation of the U.S. Judicial
Conference and its committees, and with the consent of Congress). While the
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure does not presently include rules for the
application of the provisions in chapter 15, these rules are in the drafting process.332
In addition, many federal judicial districts have adopted substantial local procedural
rules for their bankruptcy courts that supplement the federal rules.333 The procedural
insufficiencies of the EU Regulation thus can be avoided in the United States by the
promulgation of appropriate additions to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
1. Procedures for Determining CoMI
Many of the venue problems that have arisen in the administration of
international insolvency proceedings in recent years have resulted from inadequate
procedural rules. This inadequacy is particularly important in the decisions on the
location of the CoMI in the Eurofood and Daisytek proceedings. The timing of the
CoMl decision needs to be delayed to a certain extent, so that the quality of the
evidence for the decision can be improved and the parties in interest can be heard.
a. Timing of the Decision on Whether a Proceeding Is a Main Proceeding
The determination whether a transnational insolvency proceeding is a main
proceeding, based on the location of the CoMI, tends to be made at the outset of a
proceeding, within a few days of its filing. In a civil law country, this decision is
typically made at the same time as the decision opening the proceeding.334 In a
common law country, the decision is frequently included in the "first day order"
package.335
The decision whether a proceeding is a main proceeding is too important an
issue in a transnational insolvency proceeding to decide at the outset, before all of
the parties in interest have an opportunity to be heard. This decision needs careful
... See Pub. L. No. 105-8 (2005).
332 it takes approximately three years for the promulgation of revisions to the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure. Thus, it will take some time for the new rules governing chapter 15 practice to
come into force.
333 See, e.g., C.D. Cal. Bankr. R. (2005).
334 See, e.g., Eurofood-Parma, supra note 108, slip op.
335 See, e.g., Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254.
[Vol. 12
2006] THE PARMALAT AND DAISYTEK CONTROVERSIES 473
consideration after all of the interested parties have been provided notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The EU Regulation does not provide a procedure to assure
notice to the interested parties and an opportunity to be heard before the decision on
this issue is made. Furthermore, the local procedures in EU countries have produced
mixed results.
The Dublin High Court followed appropriate procedures in its Eurofood
proceeding to assure that all of the parties in interest would have notice of the
hearing on the determination whether its proceeding was a main proceeding, so that
they would have sufficient time to prepare and present the relevant information for
this determination, and that they would have a full and fair opportunity to present
their views to the court. The court took a month and a half for briefing and hearings
on this issue, and issued its ruling nearly two months after the initial filing of the
proceeding.3 6
The Parma court did require a measure of notice to the parties in interest of its
February 17 hearing on the opening of its Eurofood proceeding. When Dr. Bondi
filed the Eurofood proceeding on Tuesday, February 10, the court ordered him to
give notice to the "interested parties" of the February 17 hearing. On Friday,
February 13, at 5:15 p.m., Dr. Bondi delivered his notice to Mr. Farrell of the
February 17 hearing in Parma.337 The notice was a short form, which stated the date
and time of the hearing, and that its purpose was to determine Eurofood's solvency,
given that it had already been admitted into extraordinary administration.338
Notably, the notice gave no warning that the Parma court would take up any issues
related to whether its proceeding qualified as a main proceeding under the EU
Regulation, or where Eurofood's CoMI was located. While the Italian court had
directed that copies of the papers filed in Parma (which included nineteen exhibits)
be given to Farrell, he was not able to obtain copies (despite repeated written and
verbal requests) until after the hearing in Parma.339
Despite the direction of the Parma court to Dr. Bondi to give notice to the
appropriate interested parties, he gave no notice to either Bank of America (the
petitioning creditor in Dublin) or the noteholders represented by Metropolitan, who
clearly qualified as parties in interest.34° Bank of America learned about the hearing
on Sunday, February 15 (on a holiday weekend), and was unable to have legal
counsel attend the February 17 hearing. 34' The noteholders, represented by
Metropolitan, received notice on Sunday night, February 15, the day before a
national holiday and were also unable to present evidence at the Parma hearing, or
even arrange for local Italian counsel to attend the hearing. Their only submission
was a letter delivered to the Irish provisional liquidator, which was presented to the
Parma court in the post-hearing briefing.
On Tuesday, February 17, the court in Parma held its hearing on opening a
Eurofood proceeding in Italy. Farrell appeared and requested an adjournment to
provide additional time to present relevant evidence.342 Eurofood's bank creditors
336 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op.
... See id at 8.
338 See id.
339 See id. at 10-11.
340 See id. at 9.
341 See id. at 11-12.
342 See id. at 11.
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were unable to attend. The Parmesan court denied an adjournment, but gave Mr.
Farrell an additional thirty hours (until 7 p.m. on Wednesday) to serve additional
briefing.
343
After the February 17 hearing, the court permitted Mr. Farrell's counsel to make
copies of some of the papers that Dr. Bondi had filed. However, the press of time
and the limited copying facilities prevented Mr. Farrell from copying the entire
filing. Mr. Farrell filed his additional briefing on Thursday morning, and Bondi filed
an additional brief as well.
Thus, while there was some notice of the February 17 Parma hearing on its
Eurofood proceeding, the notice was insufficient and mostly ineffective.
None of the Daisytek decisions to open a main proceeding for its French and
German subsidiaries provided even as much notice and opportunity to be heard as
the Parma court provided in Eurofood. In Leeds, the first day hearings resulted in
decisions to open main proceedings for fourteen Daisytek affiliates.3 " For the
French and German affiliates, apparently no notice was provided to their French or
German creditors. French law required that notice be given to Daisytek-France's
one hundred and forty-five French employees, 345 who had substantial rights under
French law, including the right to be heard before the opening of an insolvency
proceeding 346 and the right to a representative in the insolvency process.347 For all
we know, if the parties in interest from France and Germany had been given notice,
an opportunity to be heard, and an opportunity to present evidence, the evidence on
which the Leeds court made its findings may have been controverted.
In the proceeding filed for Daisytek-France in Pontoise, no notice was given to
the English administrators (and apparently not to any creditors, either) before the
Pontoise Commercial Court ordered the opening of a main proceeding.348 However,
both the workers and the public prosecutor were given notice and appeared. 349 The
English administrators appeared afterwards on a motion to intervene, which the
Pontoise court denied.35 °
The defects in the German procedure for the opening of the main proceedings
for Supplies Team GmbH and ISA Deutschland GmbH arose from a different
problem. In those proceedings, the German administrator simply failed to provide
the information to the court that she had authorized the English filings for these two
companies.35' When this came to light and was presented to the German court,
however, the court refused to set aside the opening of the main proceedings.352 The
district court reversed on these grounds, and on remand (after a new judge had taken
over the responsibilities in the court), the county court opened secondary
proceedings for each of these companies. 353 In contrast, the county court took a
343 See id. The Parma court gave Mr. Farrell until 11 a.m. on Thursday to file the brief.
" See supra discussion accompanying notes 203-12
345See C. COM. art. L 621-4.
346 See id.
41 See id. art. L. 621-8.348 See Daisytek-Pontoise, supra note 212, slip op.
349 See id.
3 o See Daisytek- Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 3.
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longer time before opening a proceeding for the German parent corporation, PAR
and its initial decision was to open a secondary proceeding.3 4
My view is that a decision on whether a proceeding is a main proceeding or a
secondary proceeding should be delayed for a month or two after notice of the filing
is given to creditors, to provide both notice of a hearing on this issue and an
opportunity to be heard to all of the parties in interest. 355 The notice should also go
to those administrators and committees of creditors (if there are any) that have
already been appointed in proceedings in other countries (whether inside or outside
the EU) with respect to either the same corporate entity or a related entity. The law
should further provide that such administrators and committees, as well as creditors
in those related insolvency proceedings, have standing to be heard on the decision of
opening a main or a secondary proceeding.
Procedural rules on the decision to declare a proceeding a main insolvency
proceeding need to include both a right to be heard and a right to notice.356 Under
the Italian rules applicable to the Italian Eurofood proceeding, for example, creditors
were not recognized as parties in interest on the decision to declare the proceeding a
main proceeding, and thus they had no right to be heard.357 While the Parma court
ordered the Italian administrator (Dr. Bondi) to give notice to the interested parties,
he only gave (belated) notice to the Irish provisional liquidator and gave no notice to
Eurofood's three creditors, who apparently would have participated in the Italian
hearing had they been given the opportunity to do so.
358
Under the EU Regulation, this procedural problem cannot be solved at the
national level. However, it can be solved at the EU level by supplementing the EU
Regulation with procedural rules to assure a reasonable degree of procedural fairness
to the parties, or "due process," as it is called in the United States.
b. Nature and Quality of Evidence on CoMI
Courts must make their decisions based on the evidence presented to them.
Courts are simply not at liberty to search out their own evidence, or even to tell the
parties what evidence to present. Given the presumption that a corporation's CoMI
is found where its registered office is located,359 evidence of the location of its
registered office should be sufficient unless a party in interest disagrees. It is clear
that the evidence presented to the Parma court in the Eurofood proceeding differed
markedly from the evidence presented to the Dublin court. The remedy for this
354 See E-mail to author from Hon. Andreas Lemmert, supra note 294.
355 But see MOSS ET AL., supra note 21, 8.148 (stating that English procedural forms require a
decision, at the time of opening, on whether the proceeding is a main or a secondary proceeding). I
disagree with the timing of this decision.
356 See, e.g., Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op., at 17-19 (finding that the Irish liquidator was
not given fair notice of the Parma hearing sufficient to permit him to participate meaningfully and was
improperly denied copies of the papers presented to the Parma court).
337 See Tommaso Manferoce, Gli Organi, Gli Effett e IAccertamento del Passivo T 103.3, in IL
FALLIMENTO E LE ALTRE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI 263 (Luciano Panzani ed. 2003); Lucio Ghia, The
Italian Legislation Provided for the Parmalat Case Under a Critic Point of View, available at
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/italy/parmalat.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2005) ("[Tlhe creditors have
been deprived of their rights of credits" in the amended statute enacted for the Parmalat proceeding).
... See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 16 (opinion by Judge Fennelly).
359 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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problem lies in giving the parties enough time to collect and present the relevant
evidence before making a decision on the CoMl. 36
The nature and quality of the evidence supporting a decision to open a main
proceeding is very important. It appears that, in the Eurofood and Daisytek
proceedings, the high court in Dublin was the only first instance court with quality
evidence to support this decision. While the Dublin court appointed a temporary
liquidator on an ex parte motion based only on an unopposed affidavit of the
managing director of Bank of America,36' it postponed the decision on whether the
proceeding qualified as a main proceeding for two months, so that the Italian
administrator would have a full opportunity to be heard.
The evidence before the Dublin High Court on the first day of the Eurofood
proceeding was much more limited. The court based its decision to appoint Pearse
Farrell as provisional liquidator on a lengthy affidavit presented by Wayne Porritt,
the managing director of Bank of America NA.362 In part, the affidavit expressed the
bank's concern that Parmalat may appoint new directors, replace the existing Irish
directors, and take other actions that could result in relocating Eurofood's CoMI
abroad.363 There is no reflection in the court's decision that the decision to appoint a
temporary administrator was so urgent that it could not postpone this decision for at
least two or three days to give the creditors and other parties in interest an
opportunity to appear at the hearing and present evidence.
The Leeds Court's decision to open a main proceeding for Daisytek-France fails
to disclose the evidence to support its decision. Apparently, the only evidence
provided to the Leeds court was a fairly detailed affidavit from the chief executive
officer of Daisytek-ISA Ltd., the master English holding company for the European
Daisytek enterprise, that was filed with the bankruptcy petition. 364 Finally, it is fair
to assume that the Leeds court did not allocate much time to hearing or examining
the evidence as to the French and German Daisytek subsidiaries, because the court
made similar decisions in fourteen Daisytek proceedings that day.365
Similarly, the Parma court based its decision in Eurofood principally on
extensive papers that Dr. Bondi filed, including nineteen exhibits, which he never
provided to the Irish liquidator (either before or after the hearing in Parma). 366 The
nature of the evidence that Dr. Bondi presented to the Parma court is not disclosed in
either the Parma court's decision or the appellate decision. More troublesome, it was
also not disclosed to Mr. Farrell, the administrator appointed in the Irish case, at all
360 See infra text accompanying notes 398-400.
361 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 6.
362 See id at 6.
363 See id. at 7.
364See Daisylek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254, 1-4. A similar procedure was followed in the Enron
Direclo case, Chancery Division, 4 July 2002. Enron Directo was a sociedad limitada incorporated in
Spain. It was placed in administration by order of a London court after an ex parte hearing based solely
on a witness statement by one of its English directors and a similar statement by the administrator of an
affiliate. See Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction in the U.S. and Europe:
Reconsideration Needed at 10 (2005), available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2005/
13114.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Freshfields].
35 Indeed, in the court's eighteen paragraph decision on the fourteen applications, only paragraph 17
addresses the facts concerning Daisytek-France's CoMI.
366 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 15-16.
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before the hearing, and only in part afterwards. 367 We may fairly conclude, however,
that Dr. Bondi's evidence was extensive; we know that it included nineteen
exhibits. 368 After the hearing, the court gave the English administrators only thirty
hours to file any supplemental evidence or arguments. 69
The French commercial court that decided to open a competing main proceeding
for Daisytek-France in Pontoise had somewhat more, albeit also one-sided, evidence
in support of its decision. Bruce Robinson, the Daisytek-France president, presented
a declaration in writing and orally confirmed that the high court in Leeds had opened
a bankruptcy proceeding for Daisytek-France, and that the company was in a state of
cessation of payments.37 ° Philippe Kersebet, speaking on behalf of the employees,
explained that the workforce was restless because of the opening of the proceeding
in Leeds, and because relations with suppliers were deteriorating.37' The Daisytek-
France financial director also presented evidence on the tenuous state of the finances
of the business.372 Finally, the public prosecutor opined that the financial situation
of the company was extremely tenuous and that it was close to liquidation. 373 The
court did not hear from the administrators appointed in the Leeds proceeding until
the next month, when they filed third-party proceedings to join the French
proceeding. The court promptly dismissed their application.
In the German Daisytek proceedings filed in the DUsseldorf County Court (a
small claims court) on May 19, 2003 (the Monday following the Leeds filings), the
only evidence presented was a letter from the sole Dusseldorf business manager of
the three German subsidiaries, to which was appended the December 31, 2002
financial statement.374  The legal brief relied on the simple assertion that the
bankruptcy proceedings were being filed because of"overindebtedness. 375
Thus, except in Dublin, all of the evidence presented in the courts of first
instance in the Eurofood and Daisytek proceedings consisted of unopposed
declarations and statements presented in ex parte proceedings where possible
opponents were given either no notice whatever (Leeds, DUsseldorf, and Pontoise) or
insufficient notice to present an opposition (Parma). Because they failed to provide
an opportunity for opposition, those courts certainly lacked a balanced presentation
of the evidence on the location of the CoMls at issue, and much important evidence
was likely not presented.
The adoption of EU procedures to give timely notice and an opportunity to be
heard will vastly improve the quality of evidence presented to an EU court making a
decision on whether a proceeding should be a main proceeding based on the location
of the debtor's CoM1.
367 See id.
368 See id. at 15.
'69 See id. at 16.




374 See Dusseldorf. 501 IN 126/03, slip op. at 1.
171 See id. Overindebtedness is one of the grounds for opening an insolvency proceeding under
German law. See InsO, supra note 279, § 19. Overindebtedness arises where a debtor's liabilities
exceeds its assets. See id.
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c. Appeal of CoMl Decision
It is always possible that a court of first instance may make an incorrect decision
on the CoMI, just as a court may make a wrong decision on any other issue. The
remedy is to take an appeal.376 Such an appeal was properly brought in the French
and two of the German Daisytek proceedings. In both of these appeals, the appellate
courts looked at the appropriate evidence and corrected the mistakes of the courts of
first instance. The decision of the Parma court in Eurofood was affirmed on appeal
in Italy. An appeal in the Irish Eurofood proceeding and a further appeal in the
French Daisytek-France proceeding are pending. However, nobody took an appeal
in the English Daisytek-France proceeding (decided by the Leeds court).
3 7 7
A second remedy is also available if a court fails to apply the rules properly in
deciding that a proceeding is a main proceeding for a particular debtor. The EU
Regulation provides that a court may deny recognition of a foreign main bankruptcy
proceeding on public policy grounds. 378 As the Irish courts have shown in Eurofood,
it could possibly be proper to invoke a public policy provision where a court in
another country has acted improperly in declaring a proceeding to be a main
proceeding. 379 While a wrong decision on this issue alone is likely not a sufficient
basis for invoking the public policy exception,38 0 the Irish court found that due
process violations by the Parma court38 1 in deciding that its Eurofood proceeding
was the main proceeding required the denial of recognition of the Italian decision on
public policy grounds.
2. "Opening" of a Proceeding
There are both international and domestic procedural issues relating to the
"opening" of an insolvency case for the purposes of the application of EU
Regulation Article 16.1.
a. International Issue
An international procedural problem arises with respect to opening a case within
the meaning of EU Regulation Article 16.1, because the EU Regulation's recognition
provision takes effect upon the issuance of a "judgment opening insolvency
376 According to the Eurofood A.G. Report, supra note 28, the proper remedy for a party contending
that a court has wrongly opened a main proceeding is to take an appeal in the courts of the country where
the order was issued, with the possibility of a reference to the ECJ if appropriate. See id. 1104.
377 Arguably, the failure to take these appeals rendered the venue issues moot. Perhaps the only
issue remaining to discuss in these proceedings is whether there is anything wrong with a venue choice
when the affected creditors have failed to exercise their appellate rights.378 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 26; Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, supra note 18,
art. 6.379 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 17-19; Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op.
at 30-32.
3 The Versailles court did not invoke the EU Regulation public policy exception to refuse
recognition of the Leeds High Court decision that the Daisytek-France main proceeding was located in
England.
38 Apparently, when it issued its decision on July 27, 2004, the Irish Supreme Court was unaware of
the Italian Court of Appeals decision filed on July 16,2004 that affirmed the decision of the Parma court.
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proceedings .... The problem arises because some countries, notably the
English-speaking common law countries, do not have procedures providing
specifically for a "judgment opening insolvency proceedings."
Civil law countries invariably provide that an insolvency proceeding does not
formally begin until a court issues a judgment opening the proceeding. In their view,
the consequences both to debtors and creditors are far too important and drastic to
permit them to arise simply upon the filing of a proceeding. In Germany, for
example, an insolvency proceeding begins with a request by the debtor or creditors
to open a proceeding.383 If the request is made by the debtor, the court order opening
the proceeding may be issued almost immediately. However, there is often a delay
of several days or more.384 In France, the delay may be more significant: For a
debtor's voluntary application, it ordinarily takes a minimum of ten to fourteen days
for a court to issue an opening order, and may take much longer. 5
In contrast, there is typically no order "opening" an insolvency proceeding
subject to the EU Regulation in Ireland (or in the United Kingdom).386 In Ireland,
however, a compulsory liquidation procedure "is commenced" by order of the
court.387 This requirement applies both to involuntary cases and to the rare voluntary
case filed under Irish law.388 Such an order is arguably the functional equivalent of a
"judgment opening insolvency proceedings." In the Eurofood case, the Dublin court
issued this commencement order on March 23, 2004. If this analysis is correct, the
Parma court correctly decided that no such decision had yet been made in Ireland
when it issued its February 20, 2004 order opening an extraordinary reorganization
case in Italy.
While the Dublin trial court found, in the involuntary Eurofood proceeding, that
its January 27, 2004 first day order qualified as a "judgment" under the EU
Regulation definition, the Parma court properly found that the January 27 Dublin
decision did not qualify as a "judgment opening insolvency proceedings" that
invoked automatic recognition under the EU Regulation.389 An Irish court does not
issue a winding up order on an involuntary petition until a hearing on notice to
382 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 16.1.
383 See InsO, supra note 279, § 13.
3M See, e.g., Eurofood-Parma, supra note 108 (delay of seventy-four days before opening the
proceeding).
35 Conversation with Judge Jean-Luc Vallens, Bankruptcy Counsel, Ministry of Justice (Fr.), in
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 2004).
386 As to the England and Wales procedures on the commencement of administration proceedings,
see Daisytek-Leeds, 2003 WL 21353254; see also Moss ET AL., supra note 21, 8.52 (only the issuance
of an administration or winding-up order under English law will qualify as an "opening" under the EU
Regulation).
387 See BRAUDE ET AL., supra note 204, 27.04 [1].
38 In part, the Irish Eurofood case suffered from the Irish practice that a voluntary winding up by a
debtor almost always takes advantage of a non-judicial procedure that is not recognized under the EU
Regulation. An Irish corporate debtor rarely presents its own voluntary winding up petition to a court.
Such debtors usually prefer the cheaper and more flexible procedures of a voluntary winding up. See id.
27.04[2]; 27.05. For the insolvency procedures recognized under Article 16, see id. Annex A. The
Irish compulsory winding up by the court is included in this list, but not a voluntary winding up.
389 Indeed, this was precisely the point on which the court in Parma based its decision that a main
proceeding under the EU Regulation had not yet been opened in Dublin.
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creditors, where the debtor (and the non-petitioning creditors) has an opportunity to
contest the winding up.390
The analysis of the Italian courts could use elaboration. On February 20, 2004,
the only proceeding pending for Eurofood in Dublin was an involuntary winding up
proceeding, in which the court had not yet decided whether the case should be
commenced. It is not unusual for an involuntary case to be dismissed without
opening (in the continental European sense) or commencement (in the Irish sense).
It was impossible for the Parma court to divine, on that date, how the Dublin court
would proceed. In addition, the Dublin proceeding was a liquidation, whereas the
Parmalat cases in Parma were all extraordinary reorganization cases.
391
Given that the situation of Eurofood in the Dublin court was at best unclear,
there was a second reason on which the Parma court could base a decision to open its
own Eurofood main case. Eurofood was a part of a far larger business that was in
reorganization, not liquidation. The Parma court could properly conclude that
Eurofood should be reorganized, also. Italian public policy, recognized in the EU
Regulation as a valid consideration,392 favors reorganization over liquidation,
particularly when it involves one of the handful of largest business empires in Italy
that qualifies for extraordinary administration. In case of doubt, the Italian court
should act to permit the incorporation of Eurofood in the ongoing reorganization of
the Parmalat business empire, which had an enormous financial impact in Italy.
A complication under Irish law arises because the commencement order relates
back in time to the date of the filing of the original petition.393 In the Eurofood case,
the commencement order related back to January 27, 2004, and took effect as of this
earlier date. This raises the issue of the impact of the relation back on an
inconsistent intervening judgment opening an insolvency case in another country,
like the February 20, 2004 decision on the Eurofood case in Parma.
Relation back should not be permitted to defeat a decision like the one the
Parma court made on February 20, 2004. On that date, the Parma court correctly
determined that there was no existing Dublin "judgment opening insolvency
proceedings" that was entitled to automatic recognition. A county should not be
permitted to circumvent this requirement by giving retroactive effect to a decision
made on a later date.
This interpretation of Article 16.1 of the EU Regulation does not require
revision of the Regulation. It would be entirely appropriate for the ECJ to issue a
ruling in the pending Eurofood case supporting this outcome.394
b. Domestic Issues
If the Daisytek-France proceeding had been filed in France before the filing of
the sixteen related entities in Leeds, this proceeding would illustrate a national
390 See BRAUDE ET AL., supra note 204, 27.03[3]-[4]. In part, the Eurofood case arose from a
disparity between the procedures for opening a case for extraordinary administration under the (just
revised) Italian law and the procedures for initiating a winding up by the court under Irish law.
391 See Panzani, supra note 71, at 1, 3-4.
392 See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 26.
393 See supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
394 This issue is before the ECJ pursuant to the first two issues that the Irish Supreme Court has
referred to it. See supra notes 165-79 and accompanying text.
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advantage that the English courts enjoy over the continental European courts, which
impacts the application of the EU Regulation. In a "race to the courthouse," the
English procedure is faster than the procedure in countries such as France.
The EU Regulation provides that, once a court opens an insolvency proceeding,
this order must be recognized in the courts of every other EU country (except
Denmark, where the EU Regulation is not in force) as soon as the order becomes
effective. In consequence, as soon as a court issues an order opening a main
proceeding, a court in any other country may only open a secondary proceeding.395
Under the English procedure, an order for administration, which is the English
equivalent of an order opening a proceeding, can be obtained almost immediately
upon the filing of the proceeding. In France, in contrast, an order opening a
proceeding typically takes a minimum of ten days to two weeks (for a voluntary
proceeding) and, on occasion, can take much longer. Thus, if two insolvency
proceedings are filed at approximately the same time, one in England and one in
France, it is almost a certainty that the English proceeding will be opened as a main
proceeding (if it qualifies, in the opinion of the English judge) long before the
French court can take action.
This problem is illustrated in the Eurofood proceeding, where the Parma court
was racing to make a decision to open a main proceeding before the Dublin High
Court could do SO. 396 In taking time to assure that procedural rights were properly
respected, the Dublin court lost out in the race to judgment to the Parma court, which
quite apparently violated the procedural rights of important parties in interest. There
is perversity in a rule that awards the race to the swift, where respecting the
procedural rights of the parties in interest can easily result in losing the race.
There is a very important procedural difference between the Dublin and the
Parma Eurofood cases: The Parma case was a voluntary case, while the Dublin case
was an involuntary case filed by a Eurofood creditor. In the ordinary course of
events, the opening of a voluntary case should be essentially instantaneous, while the
opening of an involuntary case should take several weeks. If both begin an
insolvency case at about the same time, there should be no contest and the voluntary
case should open far before the involuntary case. In the Eurofood cases, however,
the involuntary case in Dublin got a substantial head start, and it was hard for Dr.
Bondi and the Parma court to catch up without substantial violation of procedural
standards.
While the Dublin High Court tried to address this issue by stating that its
decision related back to the date of the original filing, and thus predated the Parma
court decision, this rationale is problematic. The rule should provide, at least in
some circumstances, that the court to receive the first filed proceeding has a prior
right to make the first determination of whether to open a main proceeding, provided
that it makes this decision within a specified period of time, such as thirty days.
In deciding that the Leeds court applied the proper legal standard in determining
that Daisytek-France's CoM1 was located in England, the Versailles court conducted
395See EU Regulation, supra note 9, art. 16.2; Daisytek-Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 1 5-6.
396 See Eurofood-Dublin, supra note 64, slip op. at 16 (opinion by Justice Fennelly) (reporting a
statement made by one of the Parma judges at the February 17, 2004 hearing that the court was not
prepared to defer a decision to a date that would permit the Dublin court to decide the matter first).
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a thorough analysis of the reasoning of the Leeds court.397  While the Versailles
court did not review the Leeds court's weighing of the facts,398 it took a careful look
at what law the Leeds court applied to the facts. In effect, the Versailles court
conducted the same analysis of the Leeds trial court's decision as a common law
appellate court would have conducted. 99
3. "Due Process" Procedural Problems
The EU Regulation provisions on the jurisdiction of a local court with respect to
a main proceeding create a dramatic tension between the need for a court to act
quickly and the need to provide due process rights to the parties in interest. On the
one hand, the court that first opens a main proceeding is entitled to apply its
domestic law to the substance of the insolvency proceeding (with some
qualifications which are only partly addressed in the EU Regulation), and to have its
professionals do the major part of the work (and earn the major portion of the fees)
in the proceeding. In addition, local creditors in that country will likely benefit at the
expense of foreign creditors, even though, in principle, they are supposed to be
treated equally.
On the other hand, issues of due process require that a court take an appropriate
amount of time to give the parties in interest an opportunity to prepare and present
their proceedings on the issue of the location of the debtor's CoMI, as well as a
number of other important issues that typically arise at the outset of a major
international insolvency, before a court makes a decision to open a main
proceeding.
4 °°
Eurofood illustrates this tension in vivid colors. While the proceeding of the
Parmalat parent company and of certain other affiliates commenced approximately a
month earlier in Italy, the first Eurofood proceeding began in Ireland on January 27,
2004. Because the proceeding began with an involuntary filing by Bank of America,
Irish procedure required a hearing and an opportunity to contest the propriety of
commencing the winding up proceeding with appropriate evidence before making a
decision to proceed with the proceeding.40 1 The Dublin High Court proceeded with
deliberate speed, and set its hearing for four weeks later (on Monday, February 23,
2004) to determine whether the proceeding was a main proceeding.
397 See Daisytek- Versailles, 2003 WL 22936778, 5.
'9' See id.
399 While the appellate review that the Versailles court gave to the decision of the Leeds court was a
full appellate review under common law standards, it fell short of the level of review that it might have
given to a decision on appeal from a French court. For a French appeal, the court of appeal could have
made a de novo determination of the facts, as well as analyze the trial court's determination of the
applicable law.
'oo A custom has developed in the United States to limit the notice to creditors on most matters in a
Chapter I I case. An application to approve such limited notice is typically included in the motions that
are presented for court approval at the first hearing in the proceeding, which typically occurs within a day
or two of the proceeding filing. The typical notice order provides that notice of most hearings (but not
plan confirmation hearings or motions to approve the sale of substantial estate assets) is given only to the
committee of creditors, the major secured creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and any other creditors who request
that they be included on a "special notice list." The notice of a motion to designate a proceeding as a
main proceeding should not go only to the limited special notice list. It should go to all creditors,
employees and other parties in interest because of its importance.
401 See BRAUDE ET AL., supra note 204, 27.03[31-[4].
[Vol. 12
2006] THE PARMALAT AND DAISYTEK CONTROVERSIES 483
During the intervening four weeks, Dr. Bondi, the Italian administrator of the
insolvency proceeding for Eurofood's parent Parmalat, obtained an order form the
Ministry of Productive Activities for the commencement of an Italian insolvency
proceeding for Eurofood, and the court in Parma rushed to issue a judgment on
February 20, 2004 (the Friday before the Dublin hearing), finding that the Italian
proceeding was the main proceeding for Eurofood. In the process, the Parma court
clearly violated a number of procedural norms under the notion of due process (and
perhaps violated international civil rights as well).
40 2
Notions of due process require that all parties with an interest in the proceedings
(the parties in interest) have a full and fair opportunity to appear at the hearing, to
have their views heard, and to present relevant evidence.40 3  A full and fair
opportunity includes a right to sufficient advance notice of the hearing and the
delivery of copies of the relevant documents on which such a determination is
sought. We now take a more detailed look at these issues.
a. Advance Notice
Notice of a hearing on the issue of whether a proceeding should be opened as a
main proceeding should include all of the parties in interest.4°4 This should include
all of the creditors, the employees, any administrator appointed in a proceeding for
the same debtor in another country, the principal shareholders (especially including a
parent corporation), and any officials entitled to notice. Very broad notice should be
the rule, not the exception. The decision on whether a proceeding is a main
proceeding may be the most important decision in the proceeding, and all who have
an interest in the outcome should be informed of the hearing because their rights
may be substantially affected by this decision.
The advance notice given of the Eurofood hearing in Parma was very deficient.
Dr. Bondi, the Italian administrator, gave notice of the hearing to Mr. Farrell, the
Irish liquidator, in Dublin after hours on Friday (of a holiday weekend) that the court
in Parma would hold a hearing the following Tuesday at noon. It is not clear that the
notice to Farrell included the information that the Parma court's hearing included the
issue of whether it should designate its proceeding as a main proceeding. While
Farrell was able to hire counsel to attend the hearing, he was not able to collect and
present his evidence for the court in Parma. Dr. Bondi gave no notice at all to
Eurofood creditors (including those who filed the involuntary case in Dublin). They
learned of the hearing only on Monday, the day before the hearing, and were
altogether unable to hire counsel or to attend the hearing in Parma.
402 In addition, it appears that the Parma court and the Ministry of Productive Activities also
overlooked their own procedural requirements. In substance, the Italian Eurofood proceeding was an
involuntary bankruptcy proceeding brought by the administrator of its corporate parent. The only
insolvency proceeding duly authorized by Eurofood's own directors was that filed in Dublin. The Italian
courts gave no consideration to this problem.
403 While a number of countries do not have a legal concept of "due process" as such, the concept of
procedural fairness or regularity is well known throughout the world and is incorporated into the law of
most countries.
4114 Under Italian law, only Eurofood and the Parmalat administrator were recognized as parties with
respect to the opening of the case. See Panzani, supra note 71, at 4. Creditors could demand to be heard,
but had no right to receive a copy of the petition. Id.
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The hearing in Leeds, where the English court decided that England was the
CoMI for Daisytek, was also procedurally suspect. There is nothing in the reported
Daisytek decisions to indicate that any of the French or German employees,
managers, customers, or suppliers were given any notice or opportunity to be heard
at the hearing where the Leeds court issued the administration orders for these four
foreign companies. Apparently, this decision was made entirely ex parte, with no
opportunity for input from anyone except counsel for the Daisytek empire and its top
managers.
One of the most important procedural rights in a court is the right to present
evidence on one's own behalf. The right to be heard is hollow if a party in interest
does not have the right to present the evidence that supports that party's position on
how an issue should be resolved.
In the Eurofood proceeding, it is apparent that the Irish administrator was given
little opportunity to present his own evidence in the proceeding. The virtual
impossibility of presenting such evidence rested on two circumstances. First, the
Irish trustee did not know what evidence was presented by the Italian parties, and
thus was deprived of the opportunity to present contrary evidence. Second, the time
between the giving of notice (after business hours on Friday) and the hearing (the
next Tuesday) was much too short to make any effective effort to collect and present
the evidence the Irish trustee would have liked the Parma court to consider.
Furthermore, Eurofood's Irish creditors were prevented altogether from presenting
evidence to counter the evidence presented by the Italian parties because they
received even less informal notice and no formal notice whatsoever of the hearing.
b. Copies of Relevant Papers
A right to notice is not effective if the party receiving notice does not have the
right to receive copies of the papers that the court is asked to consider in making its
decision. The Parma court recognized the need to deliver such papers in the
Eurofood proceeding, and ordered that Dr. Bondi, the Italian administrator, deliver
the papers to the Irish administrator.4 °5 However, the court failed to enforce this
order when the Irish administrator appeared at the hearing and asserted that the order
was not complied with (despite repeated requests), and he had not been able to
examine any of the moving papers at all before the hearing.
The Irish administrator correctly argued that he had a fundamental right to
review the papers and to have an opportunity to respond to them before the Parma
court should proceed with its determination of the issue. At that point, the Parma
court should have adjourned the hearing to insist that the Italian administrator
comply with the order and give the Irish administrator sufficient time to review the
papers and to respond to them.
It appears that the procedure in the Leeds court in the Daisytek proceeding was
even more problematic. Because the parties apparently did not give notice at all to
the French parties in interest (including the French directors and employees), they
were also deprived of the opportunity to review the papers on which the Leeds court
made its decision.
405 See Eurofood-Ireland, supra note 80, slip op. at 13.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The European Union Insolvency Regulation is a giant step forward in promoting
international cooperation on cross-border insolvency proceedings. It adopts a
modified universalist solution to cross-border proceedings insofar as they are located
within the European Union. However, experience has shown that it needs some
improvements to work effectively.4 °6 A battle now rages between courts of several
European countries on which courts will administer particular cross-border
proceedings, and how the center of main interest is to be determined for this purpose.
This Article has shown that two very important substantive modifications would
vastly improve the EU Regulation. First, the EU Regulation needs to provide for the
filing in the same country (thereby permitting the filing in the same court) of
members of a corporate group that are economically integrated. It is very difficult (if
it is possible at all) to reorganize a corporate empire when its insolvency proceedings
are distributed among a number of countries.
Second, the EU Regulation needs to clarify the definition of CoMi and to
specify what a court should consider in making the CoMI determination. I argue that
a court should weigh the following factors: (1) the location of operations and
management decisions of the corporation; (2) the location of the "nerve center" or
place of principal decision-making for the corporation; and (3) the expectations of
creditors, such as suppliers and financiers, as to the CoMI decision in the event that
the company goes into an insolvency proceeding.
This Article has also shown that three kinds of procedural improvements are
needed. First, the EU Regulation needs to decouple the decision on whether a
proceeding is a main proceeding from the decision opening the proceeding itself, and
to give an opportunity to the parties in interest, broadly construed, to be heard on the
subject of whether a proceeding is a main proceeding. This is a decision of great
importance in a cross-border proceeding, and should not be made precipitously or
without considering the views of creditors, foreign liquidators, and other parties in
interest who want to be heard. Second, the EU Regulation needs a definition of what
constitutes a "judgment opening insolvency proceedings," to specify what steps
qualify under this term in those countries where an opening order or judgment is not
a typical part of the insolvency process. Third, procedures need to be adopted to
recognize the due process rights of foreign estate administrators, foreign creditors,
and other parties in interest throughout a cross-border insolvency proceeding.
These changes will make the EU Regulation work much more effectively in
coordinating and facilitating cross-border insolvency proceedings within the EU.
406 The European Commission is required to report on the operation of the EU Regulation by June 1,
2012. This review is apparently already underway. See Freshfields, supra note 364, at 23; Gabriel Moss
& Christoph G. Paulson, The European Insolvency Regulation-The Case for Urgent Reform (Aug. 31,
2005) (unpublished article on file with author).
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